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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
Justification of the Study

Water development and allocation have been among the most imp ortant

problems Utah has had to face throughout the past 117 years of develop ment .

When Utah's first white se ttler s, th e Mormon pioneers, ente r ed

Salt Lake Valley in July of 1847, littl e met their eyes to en tic e their
stay.

The earth was so parched and dry that they were unable t o scratc h

the surface with their plows.

Less than two hours after their arrival

members of the party began digging ditches and building dams to irrigate
and soften the earth so they could begin plowing.

l

With the coming of additional settlers it was necessary t o move to
insure an adequate supply for domestic uses as well as water for irriga tion.

Since the clear, mountai n stream water was ideal for domestic

use, steps were soon taken to divert water of l ower quality for irriga-

tion use.

The Jordan and Salt Lake Canal was such a project to bring

water from nearby Utah Lake.

2

Additional settlers and the exhaustion of l oca l water supplies made
it necessary to estab lish colonies awa y from the center of the new settle -

1H. H. Bancroft, History of Utah (San Francisco:
1889), p. 261.

The History Company,

2
Fisher Sanford Harris, 100 Years of Water Development, A report sub mitted to the Board of Directors of the Metropolitan Water District of
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake City, Utah, April, 1942, p. 5.

ment.

Exploring parties were sent in every direction to look for suit -

able l oc ations.

Water was always an important factor in selection of

a site for the new locations.

3

Cooperation was a key word in the development of Utah.

The Mormon

people worked together to build homes, schools, and churches as well as
ditches, reservoirs, and ot her needs of the community.

The conditions

prevalent in the early history of Utah made the Church organization all
powerful.

The secular as well as ecclesiastica l affairs of t he people

were administered by the Church, including problems arising over water

use.

Gradually even before many non-Mormons joined the settlements,

organizations formally separable from the Church were es tablished to
administer water problems.

The development was accentuated, moreover,

with the increased arrival of non-Mormons.

4

The irrigation company was one of the first of these organizations.

Gradually the towns and villages took steps to insure their right to an
adequate quantity and quality of water.

As demand for water increased,

steps were taken to expand or conserve ex isting supplies, and deve lop
additional sources of supply.

In most cases some type of organization was

establis hed to administer the allocation and distribution of th ese waters .

This trend has continued thr oughout the history of Utah; as water
supplies have increased, so have the institutions responsible for th e

administration of this resourc e .

Today there are a multiplicity of these

3
wells A. Hutchins, Mutual Irrigation Companies in Utah, Utah Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 199, May 1927, pp. 9-ll .

4

Ibid., p. 16.

institutions which are invo lved e ith e r dir e ctl y or indir e ctly in the
distribution and allocation o f wat e r.

Thos e institutions which appear

t o pla y an important role in Utah t oda y are:
1.

The structure of the water law

2.

The Office of the State Engineer

3.

The Utah Water and Power Board

4.

The Water Pollution Control Board

5.

Metropolitan water districts

6.

Water conservancy districts

7.

Water conservation (irrigation) districts

8.

Mutual irrigation companies

9.

Municipal water departments

This study wi ll be concerned primarily with an eva l uation of these
institutions, the part they have played in the development of Utah ' s
water policy, and the role they may be called upon to play in the future.
Objectives of the Study
The specific objectives of this study are:
1.

To identify the institutions involved in the al l ocation, and

distribution of water within Utah,

5

and to describe the functions and

responsibilities of each.
2.

To appraise and evaluate these institutio ns wit h respect to

various aspects of flexibility and security:

(1) the legal right to the

5
This study will be concerned only with state and local organizations. The federal agencies, while prominent in development and conservation, have little authority in actual water transfers, the main interest
of this paper.

4
use of water , both quanti t y and qualit y, (2) the ease or difficulty
with which transfers of these rights between uses and users can be made,

(3) the protection against loss of thi s water right due to lawf ul acts
of ot hers, a nd (4) inc enti ve to invest in and develop th e wa t e r resource .

An attempt will be mad e to answe r one overlying and highly signifi cant question.

Ar e the laws and institutions in operation today effec -

tiv ely fu lling, from an economic point of view,
wa t er program?

6

the nee ds of Utah ' s

If not, what additions or dele ti ons from the present

system would be ad vantageous?

Method of Proce dure

Since this s tud y will att empt t o evaluate the institutions involved
in water all oca tion, some norm for comparison and evaluati on must be

established.
tions .

Any thing l ess would merely be a di scrip ti on of their f unc -

Chapt er II will dea l with the development of criteria with whi ch

to make thi s eval uatio n .

A r ev iew of the lit e rature tre ating th eo r e ti -

cal considerations fo r wa t er distribution and all oc ation will form the
basis of th ese cr it e ria .

Chapter Ill will contain a desc ripti on and evaluation of the instituti ons t o be considered.

The in fo rmation for this c hapt e r was obtained

by a study of relavent publications suc h as the Re port of the State
Enginee r, the Utah Code Annotat e d, intervi ew s with heads of these insti tutions, and other studies that have dealt more specifically with one
or more of t he institutions under considera tio n.

6

An economic point of view i s based primaril y on eff icienc y and
will be discussed in the next section.

Chapter IV will attempt to draw some conclus i ons about the ove rall
efficiency of Utah's water institutions and wi ll, if necessary, make

suggestions that wou ld improve the efficiency of the v ari ous institutions.

CHAPTER II

ECONOMIC CRITERIA

Efficiency and Distribution Effects
Why should a study of the laws and ins tituti ons dealing wi th wa t e r
be undertaken by an economis t ?

Surely this area r ece i ves cons id e r ab l e

attention by legislators, lawyers, engineers, and various pub li c se rvant s .

Each of these disciplines make con tributions , but this does not diminish
the significance of laws and ins titut ions to the economist; they form
a base for economi c decision and, in fact, cons titut e part of the deci -

s i on making machinery it se l £.

1

Almost all scie nces ca n be catagor i ze d as ei ther positive, a body
of sys t ematized knowledge concerning "what is, " or normative, a body
of systematized knowledge concerned with "what ought to be. "

2

Some,

by the nature of their conten t, are both positive and normative and
economics is such a science.

Positive economics is independent of any ethica l or moral va lue

judgments .

It i s based primarily on generali zations that are deduce d

f r om theoretical propositions and then are t ested by o bserv ati on of
economic phenome na in the real worl d.

These generalization s are th e n

1stephen C. Smith, "Legal and In s tituti onal Contr o l s in Water All ocation," Journal of Farm Economi cs, XLII, No. 5 (December 19 60), 1346.

~ilt on Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago:
versity of Chi cago Press, 1953 ), pp. 3-4 .

The Uni -

used to make predictions about the consequences of some change in the
real world circumstances.

The worth of a principle is judged on the

reliability and co nsi s t ency of its predictions. 3
Economics becomes normative whenever economis ts s tra y into t he area
of "what ought to be;" i.e., are concerned wit h criteria and standards
that are judged " good" or "bad."

However undesirable it may be, most

economic studies do contain some elements of normative science .
Most of the principles associated with positive and normative econ omics can be handled as either efficiency or distribution effec t s.

The

efficiency effects deal with the size of the aggregate production whi l e
the distribution effects are concerned with who gets what shar e. 4
When any policy innovation or change wil l r esult in an increase in
the national income or community income, we say t hi s is an incr ease in
efficiency.

Or when the net \Velfare of the society under consideration

is increase d, efficiency ha s increased .

One of the values of our soc i ety

seems to be that efficiency, per se , is desirable.
It is easy to see that a policy which wou ld raise the income or we lfare of all people within the area of consid eration would be highly desirable.

But many, and probably most, proposed policy changes are

directed toward particular areas or sectors.

Even thos e policies which

might result in a net increase of community income or we l fare, are likely
to be detrimental to some.

3

This situation raises the pr ob lem of distri-

Ibid. , p. 5.

4
Jack Hirshleifer, et al., Water Supply: Economics, Technology,
and Policy (Chicago: The Univer sity of Chicago Press, 1960),p. 36.

8
bution, i .e. , is it desirable that the int e r es ts of one group of peop l e
be favored over another?
Economics alone cannot give us answers to policy
problems; it can show us how to attain effic ienc y and
what the distributional consequences are of attaining
eff iciency in alternative possible ways, but it does
not tell us how to distribute the gain from increased
eff iciency . 5

This study will att empt to remain in the realm of positive economics,
i. e., eff ici ency effects.

Hopefully, as distributional questions arise,

as they surely will, the only consideration given them wil l be to say
something about the possible consequences of alternative policies.

This is not to say that increased efficiency alone is sufficient
justification for implementing particular policies at all times.

If the

distributional effects of a policy that would increase efficiency are
extremely adverse to the well being of certain parts of society, parti -

cularly already disadvantaged groups, society itself must decide to
rej ec t that proposed policy.

Society will be better prepared to make

this de cision, however, when it has some understanding of the possible
a lt ernatives and consequences.

Market Vs. Administrative Allocation
Perhaps this is the best point to discuss a longstanding, economic

debate about resource allocation.

Broad l y speaking, ther e are two methods

of resource allocation used in our society, i.e., the market and adminis-

trative or judicial decree.

Both systems can be applied wi thout viola -

ting the criteri a that will be developed for economic efficiency .

5

Ibid., p. 5.

How-

eac h have their otvn advantages and disadvantages and, depending upon the
situation, both can be used to achieve an efficient allocation of resources .

~

Under a market system buyers and sel l ers of resources come together
in the market place and make exchanges at agreed upon rat es of exchange
(prices) .

Arguments that seem to favor a market allocation of resources

are:
1.

The market is quite effective in allocating most of our re-

sources, except where third party effects are sig nificant .
2.

I t is nondiscreti onary and automatic and provides its own infer-

ma ti on.
3.

The market price reflects resource values in various uses.

4.

Exchanges are always voluntary and compensation is always paid

any loss of resources that might accompany the exchange .
At the other pole is a system of centralized planning whereby
allocation of th e resource is effected by some authority--administrative
or judicial .

This system may be more efficient, and perhaps, the only

alternative in situations where the market wi ll not function satisfactorily, such as:
1.

In cases where th e resource is f ugitive or commonly owned and

where property rights or firm assets are impossible to define.
2.

Where third party effects are important and cannot get incor-

porated into market calculations.
3.

Where problems are so complex that some human judgement per-

forms better than an impersona l market.
4.

Where income distribution problems are important and the market

does not allocate income sat isfactorily to alleviate poverty and wi dely

10

distr i but e benefits .
By the very nature of this sys t em , it is obvious that administra-

tive decree allows a much gr eat e r chance fo r personal pr e judice or moral
c onvictio n t o e nt er into th e f inal decision.

Th erefore, the market

allocation system will be accepted, for this study, as the most effi c i ent means of allocating resources, and th e criteria developed here -

after wi ll r ef l ect this attitu de .

However, when attemp ting to evaluat e

those institutions utilizing the administrative decree sys t em, r efer e nc e

wi ll be made t o this section and how we ll they seem to follow the cri t e ri a developed in the next sec tion .
Review of the Literature

Recently there has been consid erabl e eco nomic literatur e written

about the allocation and development of water r esources .

Seve ral of

these articles , part icu larl y those tr ea ting theoretical cri t eria, will
be reviewed in an attempt to es t ab lish crite ria wher eby the r e lave nt
institutions in Utah can be eval uate d.

Eguimarginal value in use

Hirshleifer, DeHaven , and Milliman, in a book dealing wi th the
wa t er supply , are content t o all ow the free marke t almos t compl ete r es ponsibility for allocating wa t er.

To beg in the argument, they postulate

a given quantity of wat e r becomes availabl e without cos t, and the on l y
probl em i s to a ll ocate it between compe ting us es and u ser s .

An e conomic

concept which charac t e riz es an ef ficient al l oca tion und e r s uch circum-

11

stances is "e quimarginal value in use." 6

Value in use is essential l y

measured by the maximum amount of resources (dollars) which the consumer
would be willing to pay for that unit, while margina l value in use is
the value in use of the last unit consumed. 7

The principl e, then, is that the resource should
be so allocated that all consumers or users derive
equal value in use from the marginal unit consumed
or used.B
Achievement of such an equali t y would necessitate some system of

shares, rights or other means of defining pr oprietorship which would
allow the owners to sell, trade, or otherwise exchange water.

The market, then, is one way of organizing to produce economic
efficiency.

Incentive to trade wil l continue until maximum efficiency

is achieved.

Why?

As long as the marginal va lue of wa ter is greater

to one user than another, the former will be willing to pay more for the
l ast unit of water considered than it is worth to the latter, making it

pr ofitable for both to initiate a sale or exchange .

Such bargaining and

trading will continue until exchanges, profitable to all parties, cannot

be achieved . 9

6
7
8
9

Ibid., p. 36.

Ibid., p. 37
I bid .

Ibtd

p. 38.

12
The Heady-Timmons position

Heady and Timmons have attempted to develop an economic framework
for planning and legislating efficient use of water resources.
main concern is to maximize economic welfare.

sary to achieve this goal are:

10

Their

Two major criteria neces-

(1) the efficient allocation of wa t e r

betwe e n competing uses to max imi ze socia l product, and (2) the eq uitabl e
disttibution of the product or income of this resource among the indivi-

duals within the sector.

11

As well as devising laws and physical means

t o attain these conditions, the authors are concerned with two important

side conditions:

(a) the l ega l and physical means to allow reasonable

certainty in the use of water and the distribution of its benefits, and

(b) the possibility of gradual change to allow diversities between uses
and users to meet the changing preferences of socie t y. 12
To attain the first major condition, which is the main emphasi s of

the paper, Heady and Timmons outline three necessary steps:

(1) determine

the supply of water, (2) determine alternative uses and production possibilities, and (3) apply a choice criterion or yardstick to determine
whic h uses are most important and in line with the relative wants or

desires of the consumer . 13

10
E. 0. Heady and John F. Timmons, "Economic Framework for Planning
and Legislating Efficient Use of Water Resources," Iowa's Water Resources,
ed. John F. Timmons, et al. (Ames , Iowa: Iowa State College Pr ess, 1956),
pp. 47-61.
11
12
13

Ibid., p. 51.
I bid .
Ibid., p. 52.

13
Following economic theory, the pricing mechanism is the c hoice
criterion or yardstick whereby the consumer can demonstrate the r e lative

importance he places on various produc t s in the market.

Heady and Timmons

point out th e difficulty involved in placing a value on suc h intangible
u ses of water as recreation and floo d prevention.

lem a sys t em of priority use is s ugg es t ed.

To overcome thi s prob-

Pri ority us e impli es ranking

the various uses t o which water can be applied in ord er of importanc e .
Wa t er fo r domes tic consumption wo uld und oubt ed l y have high es t priorit y
14
but beyond that point, much more s tudy needs to be und e rtake n .
Wantrup's economi c cri t eria conce pt s
Criteria for eva luating wa t er resource al l ocatio n developed by
Wantrup ar e concerned more with increasing national income th an maximizing

soc ial sa tisfac ti on . 15

The co ncepts of security and flexib il ity of wat e r

rights are discussed a s the most significant conditions which facilitate
or impede such an increase.
To the economist security has t wo connotations :

(l) protection

against physical uncertainty, ( e.g. , supp l y of the quan tit y of water
usab l e under th e right and qual it y), and (2) protection aga inst variability over time due to the lawful acts of others . 16

Phys i cal uncer -

ta i nt y can be r educ ed s i gni f icantl y by physical means such a s wat e r
s torage and pollution control .

14

Of much mor e int e r est, at l east in the

I bi d., p. 56.

15 s. V. Ciriacy -Wantrup , ·~oncepts Used as Economic Criteria for a
Sys tem of Water Right s, " Land Economics, XXXII, No . 4 (Novembe r, 1956) ,
295-312.
16

I bi d., p. 297.

14

context of appraising in st ituti ons, i s the secur it y of wat e r ri ght s
against t enur e uncertainty.

There are three f actors present t o s ome

degree in all systems of wa ter ri ghts which affect security of t e nure:
(l) prescription, (2) di ffere ntiati on of preference classes bas ed on
purpose of wa ter use, and (3) a restriction on wa ter rights t o yield
t o fu ture demands of others.

17

A s ub-topic of sec urit y of t e nur e , protec tion of investme nt, i s
f avored by Wantrup in c ases wh ere the water right is insecur e , s uch a s
wa t e r held in r eserva tion by a muni cipality for fu tur e us e and being
appropriated only t emporaril y by another user.

18

This private us e r wi ll

not inves t in the wate r r esourc e beyond the point warranted by th e
e xp ec t e d income s tream unless he r e c e ives some guarante e of "ad equate
compensation 11 for nonr ecovery of investment plus a sufficient profit
mar gin .

Whe n these conditions are not me t, considerable und er utiliza-

tio n of the r eso urce will persist .
The cri t er ion " f l ex ibility of wat e r rights," focus es on those aspec t s of water rights which facilitate or o bstruct changes over time in
the allocation of water r esources be t ween uses and users.

19

Whe ther or

no t water can move from a use of l ow productivity to one o f high er productivi t y is important.
several ways .

The transfer of water can be accomplished in

Voluntary transfer through buying and selling in the

market place is not uncommon .

17
18

Ibi d., p. 300.
Ibid., pp. 301-303.

l9 Ib id., p. 304 .

Involuntary transfers, such as presc rip -

15
tion, abandonment and forfeiture, and condemnation are important parts

of a system of wa t er rights.
Thus Wantrup concludes that in the area of natural resources, and
particularly water allocation, direction rather than exact destination
is the important consideration.
The emphasis of this approach is on minimum standards in resource use rather than on the o ptimum use;

on establishing base levels rather than on l ocating
peaks; on avoiding dead-end streets and on keeping
direction rather than on computing the short es t dis-

tance; on mobility and adaptability of productive fac tors rather than on the ir optimum combination; on
reducing institutional obstac l es to wate r deve lopment
rather than on maximum level development; and on provisions in wa ter law that facili tat e changes over time
in water allocation rather than on an opt i mum water

al locat ion at particular times and places.20
Economic Criterian

The criter ia whereby th e institutions involved in the di stribution
and allocation of water in Ut ah wi ll be evaluated are:

(l)

Equimarginal value in use.

Water should be so allocated that

all users derive equal value in use from the marginal unit consumed

or used.

This concept implies a high degree of flexibility since it

relies o n a movement of water from uses of low productivity to those of

higher productivity.
(2)

A system of vested rights or proprietorship which guarantees

the owner final dispositi on of th e prescribed water.

It must also

insure adequate compensation if the right is transferred invo luntaril y ,

20

rbid., p. Jll.

16
such as condemnati on proc eedi ngs.

Such a system would pro v id e security

against tenure uncertainty and insur e investment t o the point warrant ed
by the poten tial income s tr eam created by the wate r in us e .

The fol l ow ing questions as sub-topics might be examined to evaluat e
the ins tituti ons.

l.

What degree of proprietorship is granted with an appropriation?

Can water rights be bought, sold, or rented freely?
be made wi thout filing additional applications?

Can changes in use

Can changes be made

wi thou t l osing priority?
2.

Is there a system of priority uses?

c hanges in use and between users?

Does it facilitate or hinde r

I s the priority system flexible ove r

time t o meet changing conditions?
3.

What l egal mechanisms ex ist within the institutions to insure

trans fe rability?
4.

Are water rights ind e pe nd e nt of property ownership?

5.

Does the l aw provid e for sec urit y of t e nure?

6.

Is compensation guaranteed in cases of condemnation?

a f ixe d method for determining compensation?

I s the r e

Is th is adequate t o insure

inves tme nt?

7.

Is ex pe nsive litigation needed to maintain tenure?

8.

What protective measur es are the re to ins ure the quality of

water?

9.

Do the pricing po lici es of distributing institutions att empt to

recover the fu ll cost of supplying the water?
or even an average cost basis?

Is this done on a marginal

17

10.

Is there incentive for developing new sources of s uppl y?

What has been the development process?
These ques tion s will be cons i de r ed, as they apply, in the fo ll owi ng disc ussions of the various Utah in s titu tions.

18

CHAPTER III

DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF INSTITUTIONS

Water Law

Riparian doctrine

Water law is represen t ed throughout th e United States by two major
legal doctrines, riparian and appropriation.

The riparian rights doc-

trine, inherited from English common law, holds that the owner of land
which a djoins a stream or body of wa t er has rights t o the use of that
water.

The water is a s egme nt of his property e nd owme nt.

The amount

of water he may use and the purpose for which he may use it are not
sub j ect to exact determination.

However, the courts , which have general

supervisio n of this doctrine, have favored the "r easonab le use 11 rul e.
Under this rule each riparian owner may use water to the ex tent of his
domestic needs, and then, sub j ec t t o the domestic uses of other riparians,
may use water for such other purposes and in such amounts as is reas onable
in the light of all surrounding circumstances.

1

The riparian doctrine was developed and has remained in use in
areas of abundant or at l eas t ample water supply.
water sources are not so abundant.
water sources.

But in the arid West

There is often many miles between

Also, the annual rainfall is considerably less.

It was

1clyde 0. Fisher, Jr., '~e s t e rn Experience and Eastern Appropriation Proposals, 11 The Law of Water Allocation in th e Eastern United States,
ed. David Harber and Stephen Bergen (New York: The Ronal Press Co.,
October, 1956), pp . 66-67.

19
readily ap par en t t o th e e arli er se ttl ers in Utah that the ripa rian doctrine was no t adequate.

They favored and adopted the appropriati on doc -

trine.

Appr o priation doctrine

Under the appropriation doctrine all water is property of the state.
Right t o the us e of that water is granted by the state upon the request
to apply previously unappropri at ed water to a beneficial us e , irrespective of the l oc ation of use in relation to the source of water.

Admin-

istered eit her by the cou rts or some o ther institution assi gne d that

specif ic responsibilit y , this doctrine l e nds itself more t o flexibi lit y
sinc e wat er can be us ed away f r om lands adjacent to th e source.

It places

a premium on actual benef icial use of water becau se unused r i ght s ar e

not al l owed t o persist.

Sec urity of t en ur e seems great e r und e r the ripar-

ian doctrine al th ough some have all e ged the priority give n an appropriated ri ght as s ur es greater sec urity than th e r e asonabl e us e rul e .

The appropriation doc trin e , as it is applied in Utah, wil l be discussed in the fol l owing section in much more detail.
Proprietorship of th e water right.

An appropriated wa ter right gran ts

the right to use a specific quantity of water, for a specific use, t o be
taken at a specific point of dive rsi on .

The early settlers in Utah appro-

priated water for some intended use by merely placing a written c laim in
a ca n nailed t o a tree close to the diversion point.

3

Gradually many

2 r bid., pp. 86-8 7.
3
wayne D. Criddl e , Utah's Future Water Problems (Logan , Utah:
Utah State University Press, 1958), p. 6.

The
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claims were filed in county offices.

This procedure r es ulted in over

appropriation of most streams, emphasizing the need for a more reliable

means of defining individua l wate r rights. 4
On March 12, 1903, the first comprehensive water law for the state
of Utah was passed.

This law required all future appropriations of

water to be filed and c l ear ed through the Office of the State Engineer.
All persons having rights to the use of water at that time were awarded
"diligence rights" to their water supply upon proof that the right was
in existence prior to 1903. 5
The 1903 law specified all water within the boundaries of the state
to be the property of the public. 6

The desire to apply water to a bene -

ficial use gives anyone a potential claim upon the state's water r esources

since beneficial use is declared to be a public use.

7

Any qualified person or organ i za ti on wishing to apply water to some
bene ficial and useful purpose must make an application for such an appro-

priation to the State Engineer.

8

If it is determined , after initial

inves tigations, 9 that th e re is unappropriated water at the source speci-

5
Twenty-ninth Biennial Report of the State Engineer to the Governor
of Utah: Biennium July 1, 1952 to June 30 , 1954 (Salt Lake City, Utah,
1954), p . 19.
6
utah Code Annotated, 1953, 73-1 -1.
7

Ibid., 73 -1-5.

9
The procedure followed by the State Engineer in perfecting a water
right will be discussed in more detail in the next section of this chapter .
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fied in the application, and the intended use is beneficial, the application is approve d.

This approval is only a preliminary step .

It me r e l y

empowers th e applicant with the authority to proceed and perfect the
right.

10

A valid appropriation is constituted by:

(l) an intent to apply

the water to some beneficial us e , (2) diversion of that water f rom i t s
natur a l channel, and (3) the actual application of th e resource to some
us eful industry.

11

To perfect a right the applicant must co ns truct any

works necessary to divert and convey water to the point of proposed use.
The construction of these works and the application of water to a1 bene-

ficial use must be comp l eted within a time period specified by the State
Engineer.

12

After the applicant has completed construction and all ot her details
necessary to perfect his rig ht, he must furnish proof of such to the
State Engineer, who, upon veritification of the claims, will issue a

certificate of appropriation defini ng the quantity of water appropriated,
the purpose for whi ch the water is used, the time during which the water
is to be used each year, the source from which the wa t er is diverted,

and the date of the appropriation .

10

13

Littl e Co ttonwood Water Co . v. Kimba ll, 76 U. 243, 289 P. 116.

llSowards v. Meagher, 37 U. 212, 108 P . lll2.
12
Utah Code, 73-3-12.
13
this

Ibid., 73 - 3-1 7.

sec tion~

Priority of ri ghts will be discussed later in
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Once a water right has been ves t ed , that water ceases to be public

water and is not subject to further appropriation, 14 wit h two exceptions:
l.

Abandonment.

To constitute abandonment there must exist a t the

same time both an int ent i on to abandon and an actual failure t o use the

appropriated water .

If the right is unused for a period of five years

and the appropriator fails to apply for an ex t ension of time within which
he may resume us e of the water, the water reverts to the public and is
again subject to appropriation.
2.

Eminent domain.

15

This power is held in reserve by most govern-

mental institutions in the state.

These institutions may instigate con-

demnation proceedings against any part or all of any water supply or
property connected th erewith whenever the acquisition of additional
water is necessary for the public good.

16

In all cases where rights are taken by condemnation, compensation
is guaran teed.

A court, jury or re feree must ascertain and assess the

condemned property with respect to :

(l) the value of the property sought

and all improvements thereon; (2) if the property sought is on l y part
of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to that remaining due
to the severence of the part condemned; and (3) the damages resulting
f r om the construction of proposed improvements, even though no par.t is

taken .

17

14
Tanner v. Bacon, 103 U. 494, 136 P . 2d 957.
86 u. 4()"P.Zd 75-5-. l5utah Code, 73-l - 4.
16

Ibid., 10 - 7- 4.

l7Ibid ., 78-34-10.

Wrathall v. J ohnson,
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The amount paid the condemnee is based on the market value of th e
property condemne d .

In cases whe r e only part of the right is condemned,

t he dif fe r e n ce in market va lu e befor e and after condemnation rathe r than
the cost of restoration should be paid.

18

When there is no readi l y

ascertainable market valu e, the "inher e nt va lue 11 of the ri ght is the
norm for compensa tion. 19

In seve ral western s t a t es water rights can be obtained (l os t) by
prescriptio n .

A prescriptive right r esults when an individual, group,

o r corporation can prove in a cour t of law that they have used all or

any part of the wa t er appropriated by another user, ag ainst his will
a nd /or wi thout hi s knowledge, over a s pecified pe riod of t ime .

Unde r

these conditions the right to the use of that amount o f water pa sses
dir ect l y to the adverse use r. 20
Prescriptive right s are not part of Utah water law.

In this sta t e

when condition s exist that would genera ll y constitute a prescrip tive

right, that quantity of water is considered abandoned and r ever t s t o the

public for further appropriation.
The usufructuar y right t o the use of wa t er given an applicant does
not give him the ri ght t o use tha t water for any o the r purpos e .

Once an

approp r iat i on ha s been made, a c han ge in use or point of diversi on may

be

~ade

18
19
20

on l y by an applic a ti on to e nact s uch a ch ange approve d by the

stat e v . Ward , 112 U. 452, 189 P. 2d 113.
sigurd Ci t y v. State, 105 U. 278, 142 P. 2d 154 , 199 .

samue l C. Wie l, Water Rights in the Wes t e rn Stat es , Vo l. 1 (3d
ed., Sa n Francisco: Bancr of t-\</hitney Company, 1911), pp. 622-640 .

24
State Engineer.

21

Whether or not the vested rights of others are impaired

is crucial to a proposed change in use or diversion point.

However,

applications will not be rejected solely upon this criterion; if otherwise proper, it may be approved as to part of the wa t er involved, or upon

conditions that the conflicting rights be acquired. 22
Priority of water rights.

A common phrase under the appropriation

doctrine is "first in time, first in right ."

This is no less important

in Utah.
Priority dates are assigned all vested rights.

These dates corres -

pond to the date the initial application was filed with the State Engineer.23

Appropriators have priority among themselves according to the

dates of their respective appropriations.

Under the system employed in

Utah, the se ni or appropriator is e ntitl ed to receive his whol e s upply
before any subsequent appropriator has the right to any water from that
source .

This same procedure follows until all appropr iator s have received

their fu ll supply or all the water has been diverted and usect. 24
In times of scarcity, however, priority dates app l y on ly to those
right s within the same use; i.e., domestic, agricultural, industry,
recreati on, power and others .

Priorities are then assigned to uses in

order of importance to guaran t ee most beneficial uses an adequate supply.
Dome stic uses have been assigned highest priority with agriculture re-

21

utah Code, 73 -3- 3.

22 Ibid.
23
24

utah Code, 73 -3-18.
Ibid., 73-3 - 21.

25
ceiving priority over all uses except domestic. 25

Water appurtenant to the land.
independent of the right to the land.

The right to the use of water is
26

The Utah Code spec ifi es that

water rights may be transferred in substantia ll y the same manner as real
27

estate.

Since Utah law also requires that an application to change the

use or point of diversion must be accepted by the State Engineer prior
to such a c hange, parties are not completely free to separate the water
from the land.

The general procedure followed is that a conveyance of

land passes an appurtenant water right unless specifically deeded separ ately in which case, approval of the State Engineer is most gener'ally
required.

28

In cases where water rights are represented by shares of stock in
a corporat i on, they will in no way be considered appurt enant to the

land .

29

Evaluation of Utah water law
It appears that current Utah wa t er laws have progressed a l ong way
toward establishing water r ights as a property right permitting exchange
transactions in the market.

The requirement that all changes in use or

point of diversion must first be approved by the State Engineer possess

25 r b id.
26
27

sowards v . Meagher , 218.
utah Code, 73 -3-21.

2 Bwie l, Water Rights in the Western States, p. 586 - 594.
29

utah Code, 73 - l-10 .
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one possible rest ri ction upon the property right .

Whether or no t thi s

is, in fact, a se ri ous restriction to efficiency wi ll depend on the

attitude of the Office of the State Eng ineer as wel l as the s tat e and
district court s in case liti gation ensues from a conflict.

The powers granted the State Engin eer in this area ar e largely
discretionary and, as such, are continually subject to judi c ial review .
The primary criterion us e d by the State Engineer in making a decision is

the vested rights of others; will they be impaired by the granting of
such an ap plication?

A liberal attitude ha s prevailed in the Office of

the Sta t e Engineer over the past 20 year s.

30

Applications have gene rall y

been g r an t ed as long a s a ser i ous impairment of existing rights have no t
accompanied the change.

Applica t ions t o change use are rar e ly r e j ec t e d

since this would generally cause little impairment of rights owned by
o the r s .

Approval of an applicati on to change the point of diversion re -

quires subst antial pr oof that serious impairment of existing rights wi l l

n ot follow .
In a 1951 c ase, American Fork Irrigati on Company v . Linke , the

courts estab li shed a l ibera l po li cy in granting changes that ha s bee n
fo ll owed qui t e closely , at least be t ween 1951 and 1962.

In upho ld i ng a

court ' s dec ision to reve rse the decision of the State Eng inee r in deny-

ing an application, the Supr eme Court of Utah held that:
We r e cognize plainti ff 's dut y t o prove that ves ted
r i ghts will not be impair e d by approval of their applica-

30

sased on a r eview of change applications and transfe rs and int e r -

views with office personne l, primaril y Dallin W. Jensen, Assistant Atto r-

ney General assigned to the State Eng inee r.

27
tion, but we must also recognize that such duty must not
be made unreasonably onerous, to the point where every
remote but presently indeterminable vested right must be
pinpointed. And we cannot turn a deaf ear to every
request which reasonably appears fo r a more beneficial
use of water not impairing vested rights, by saying as
the Engineer in his decision did, that the proposed change
could interfere substantially with the vested rights of
others.3l
This has been the policy of administrators and the court until a
1962 case dealing with a change application, Piute Irrigation Company v .
West Panguitch Irrigation and Reservoir Company.

32

The state Supreme

Court reversed an early decision to allow West Panguitch Irrigation and
Reservoir Company to store water in reservoirs for summer use which was
previously used only to flood pasture land during the winter on grounds
that such storage would not deprive any of the lower water users of water
that would have reached the Piute Reservoir.

In his decision to grant

the application the State Engineer pointed out that there cou l d be a
"de minimus" loss of water to the lower users.

During the rehearing the

court asserted that the degree of impairment should play no role in the
decision; an application should be rejected if there is any impairment
of existing rights.
A dissenting opinion in this same case asserted the necessity of
allowing wide latitude in granting changes in order that water may move
to its most productive use.

31

American Fork Irrigation Company v. Linke, 121 Utah 190, 239 P .

2d 188.
32
Piute Irrigation Company v. West Panguitch Irrigation and Reservoir
Company, 13 Utah 2d 6, 367 P. 2d 855.

28

It seems reasonable that so me institution be responsible for protection of other water users in event of change in use or point of diversion.
Security of tenure tvould be severely hampered if this we r e not the case.
Efficiency, however, dictates a liberal transfer policy must be main-

tained.

The limitations to efficiency that may resul t from the Piute

Irrigation Company v. West Panguitch Irrigation and Reservoi r Company

decision will depend largely on the future direction of the courts.
For the time being it seems that this latest decision has not essentia lly
affected the attitude of those administering the law .
No loss of priority accompanies permission to effect a change in us e
or diversion, once granted, thus eliminating a possible barrier to

applications for such changes.
A statement sometimes made is that

11

Utah's water law and regulations

prohibit free movement of water resources to the use where they have

the highest marginal utility.•• 33

Support for this philosophy is taken

from section 73-3 - 21 of the Code specifying priorities that will exis t
in times of extreme scarcity.

Probably because of the difficulty invol -

ved in defining extreme scarcity and also because the law is s il ent as
to whether compensa tion would have to be paid if water was taken from
the lower priority use, this sec tion has never been impl emented. 34

33
seth H. Schick, "Demand for Household Water in th e Northern Utah
Area, 1962" (Master's Thesis, Agricultural Economics, Utah State University, 1964), p. 3. Gold en Earl Poor, ' ~ater Policy and the Industrial
Development of Utah" Master's Thesis, Business, University of Utah, 1954),
p. 34.
34 rnterview with Dallin W. Jensen, Assistant Attorney General
assigned to the State Engineer, May 15, 1964.
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I t seems qu i t e he r o i c t o ar gue that Utah wa t e r law i s ineff i cie nt
on the ba s i s of just one emergency r e qu i r eme nt that ha s ne ve r been impl e ment ed i n practic e .

One wr i t e r s ugges t e d r evampi ng thi s se ction t o g ive

indus t r i a l use pri orit y ove r agr i c ulture .35

Thi s sugges ti o n would be

s ubj ec t t o the same criti c i sm a s the rul e tha t agriculture ha s priorit y
ove r indu s try.

Both are e s se ntially a rbitrary and it is impossible to

gene r a li ze tha t one use i s mo r e val ua bl e t han ano the r.

Wha t i s needed i s a f l ex i bl e l aw t hat does no t e stabli sh pri oriti e s
at a ll.

De l e ti on o f th e r equirement unde r conside ration wo uld he lp.

The mar ke t s hould be pe r mitted t o all oca t e wa t e r , e ven (in fact, e s pe ci ally ) i n ti mes of extreme sc ar c it y .

I f wor se came to wors e , pu bli c in-

stitut io ns would still r e t ain the powe r of emine nt domain and co uld
acquir e what eve r water they need to mee t domes tic needs .
Securit y of tenur e does no t s eem t o be a pr oblem with wat e r law.
Once a r ight ha s been ves t e d it c annot be l os t against the owne r' s wi shes
by any means , with the single except i on of em ine nt domain.

Eve n th en a

right wi l l no t be taken fo r any use whi ch th e co urt doe s no t rule t o be
o f gr eat e r be nef it to th e publi c.

Thi s ge ne r a ll y protects the right

from a ll uses other than domes tic.
Whe n emine nt domain i s empl oye d, ade qua t e compensati on ba sed on
as ses s e d marke t value, i s guar ant eed.

By law, this compensation s hou l d

cove r a ll inve stment in th e right a s we ll .
The r e ha s been con s id e rabl e deve lopm ent of water resourc es in the
pas t few ye ar s.

Water law in no way r es trict s s uch developme nt and it is

35Poor , Wate r Po lic y and th e Indus trial Deve l opment of Utah, p . 36.
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genera ll y carried on within t he context of a state insti tution or in
conjunction with the Federa l Government.

The state is empowered t o

en t er into contract for joint studies and development of all water r e sour ces within the state.
In summary, it appear s that Utah wa t er law is r e asonabl y conducive
to economic all ocat ion of the water re sourc e.

A sys t em of propert y

rights have been estab li shed and some are being bought and traded in
quasi-markets.

Thi s i s not to say that all water transactions are effec -

t e d within a market si tuati on the same as o ther resources, i.e., food,
c l othing , and real estate .

We are not too far removed from the times

,.,he n lives were lost over ,.,ate r right d i sputes.

Water ri ghts still ar e

e steemed by many in the same manner as family heirlooms, 36 a situation
which sometimes prevents an ef ficient, eco nomic a ll oc ation of the r e source .

But this is a problem of attitud e and not of water law.

The Off ic e of the State Enginee r

Adoption of the appropriative doctrine dictates t hat some person
or agency mus t accept the r es pon s ibilit y of administering arid allocating
the state 's water resources.

There ar e t wo me thods commonly employed,

both of which will be co n s id e r e d in this section.

Judicial allocation of wat er
The judicial sys t em, a s employed in Colorad o , r eq uires a prospectiv e
wa t e r u se r to br ing a private suit in th e appropriate distr i ct court

36
Fr ank J. Trelease , "Water Law and Economic Transfer of Water,"
Journal of Farm Ec onom i cs , XLIII (December, 1961), 1152 .
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requesting the privilege of using water.

The petitioner is required to

furnish evidence that there is unappropriated water and that it wil l be
put to beneficia l use.
testify.

Any party protesting the appropriation may also

37

The task of the district court is to determine:

(1) whether un-

appropriated water exists, (2) whether it will be put to benefic ial use,
and (3) if th ere wil l be any detrimental third party effects.

The court

wil l decide the case entirely on th e evidence presen t ed by the petitioner
and the protestant.

38

Several inherent difficulties in thi s judicial process are:

1.

The court must decide the case on the ev idence pr ese nt ed by

the petitioner or protestant rather than on the testimon y of some quali-

f i ed person representing the public int eres t .
2.

Legal criteria ar e gl.ven primary co nsideration; economic criteria

are almost comp letel y ignored .
3.

The possibility of collusion ; all the farmers in one area might

protest a transfer in denfese of a friend, even though the transfer has
no direct effect on them.
4.

A di st rict court may tend to favor the popular us e of wa t er

within the area over which they preside.

39

37
n. A. Seastone and L. M. Hartman, "Alt erna t ive Institutions for
Water Transfer: The Exper~enc e in Co l orado and New Mexico," l and Econ omics XXXIX (F e bruary, 1963), 34.
38Ibid.
39

Ibid . , pp. 35-37.
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This process had led to costly investment in a future supply rather
than attempting an appropriation of water through the court.

40

Administrative allocation of water

The other primary method plac es the responsibility of administering
the state 's water resources under the executive branch of the state govern -

ment.

Generally this power r es ides with the State Engineer.

The duties

and procedures fo ll owed by th e State Engi neer in Utah will be discussed
in detail.
The instigation of the first comprehensive water law in 1903 gave
specific responsibilities t o the Office of the State Engineer .

To be

appointed by the governor wi th consent of the senate, the sta t e e nginee r
would have excl usive r es ponsibilit y for supervising th e measurement,
apportionment, appropriation, and distribution of all waters within th e

state. 41
1.

Specifically, the state engin eer has the power to:
Make and abolish rule s and regulations necessary to carry out

the duties of his office.
2.

Bring suit in courts to e njoin the unlawful use of both s ur face

and underground water and to prevent waste , loss, or pollution of the
water resources.

3.

Establish water districts and define the boundaries of each.

No person can be appointed unless he has been a bona fide resident
of Utah for at l east three years and no less than five years expe rience

40
41

Ibid., p. 37.
u tah Code, 73 - 2- 1.
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as an

.

eng ~neer.

42

In accordance with the authority to employ sufficient personnel to
perform the duties of the office, the Office of the State Engineer emp loys
engineers, accountants, technicians, offic e personnel, legal counsel,
and whatever othe r personnel are necessary.

43

The oper at i ons of the office are financed by biennial appropriations
from the State Legislature, collection and disbursement of

f~es

in con -

nection with application, photostating of r ecords, and other mi scel lane ous
services, as we ll as funds received from individuals or other organ i za -

tions to finance special invest i gation and water distribution.

44

Determining a valid appropriation
Upon receipt of an application to appropriate water the state engineer

must approve or reject the application on the bases of :

(1) whether or

not there is unappropriated water in the proposed source, (2) whether
or not the proposed use will impair existing rights or interfere with

a more beneficial use, (3) the technical feasibility of the proposed
plan, and (4) the financial ability of th e applicant to complete the
proposal as outlined on the application and not for the purpose of spec ulation or monopoly.

42

43

45

Ibid.
Ibid., 73 - 2-4 .

44

Thirty - Fourth Biennial Report of the State Engineer to the Governor
of Utah; Biennium July 1, 1962 to June 30, 1964 (Salt Lake City, Utah:
1964), p. 10.
45

Utah Code, 73-3-8.
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The initial i nvestigatio n he lp s determine almost simultaneous l y ,

the first two ob j ect i ves.

The State Eng ineer must determine b y inves -

tigating flow records and prior appropriations of the source if th e r e is
sufficient water to satisfy the application withou t impairing exis ting

right s.

He mu s t als o advise all persons who may have an interest in the

gran tin g of s uch an application of the d e tail s s pec i f i ed in the applica tion.

This is generally done by publication in a news pape r having general

circulation in the area to be a ffec ted .

Any person op po s ing the applica-

tion may f ile a writ t en protes t with the State Engineer. 46

"

.....

In dec iding whether or not to grant an applicat i on to appropriate ,

it has been rul ed that i n a doubtful case the application should be
grant ed , sinc e the po li cy of the law is t o prevent waste and promote

benefic ial us e.

This means that the State Eng inee r need not find affir-

matively that the r e i s unapp ropriat e d water in the source; on l y when th e

source i s obv i ous l y ful l y appropriated should the appli ca tion be rej ec t e d. 47
In making his fina l decision th e Stat e Eng ineer may r equir e whatever
additional in fo rmation he fee l s pertinent.

For examp l e , he may r e quir e

a " sta tement of financial ability" showing that the applicant(s) is able,
as well as wi lling , to carr y out the proposed work .

48

Once a dec ision has been made by the Stat e Eng ineer, that decision

is f inal unless any person aggri eve d by the dec isi on wishes to brin g

4 6rbid., 73-3 - 6 .
47 Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, V. 76 , p. 116.
48

utah Code, 73- 3-11 .
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within 60 days a civil action in the district court for a pleanary

review. 49
The same gene ral procedure is followed by the State Engineer in
dealing with applications to change use or diversion point , exte nd time

in which to perfect a right, and extension of time for nonuse . 5°
Other responsibilities of the state engineer include determination
of existing rights to water upon any stream or source.

Suit is to be

brought into district court by the engineer if upon initial investigation
he f inds evidence to justify a determination. 51

He is empowered to

cooperate with administrators of other states in determining rights to
interstate waters as well as appropriating interstate wa t ers .

52

In

cases whe r e two disputing parties attempt to nego tiate an agreement as
to compensation for impairment of rights, the state engineer acts as an
arbitrator and often writes their agreement into his decision.

53

The state e ngineer appoints water commissioners, enters into investigations and studies of all water resources in the state, and, as

pointed out earlier, has general responsibility for all th e water within
the state.

49

Ibid., 73 - 3-14; 73 - 3-15.

50rbid., 73 - 3-3; 73-3-12 .
51
52
53

Ibid., 74-4 -l.
rbid., 73 - 2- 8; 74 - 4-2 .
utah Code, 73 - 2-3.
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Evaluation of the Office of
the State Engineer
An evalu ation of the law s under whi ch the state eng in eer operates
as well as t he position of the courts was discussed in the previous
section on water law .

Thi s eva luation concluded that water law, for the

most part, does not present a significant barrier to market allocation

of water.

The possible defects in the law, with respect to efficien t

wa t er allocation, are in the area of certain discretionary powers granted
the state engineer .

To the extent that economic cr it eria are ignored

in the application of these powers, efficiency is impaired.

These powers

and the state engineer's application of them will form the bulk of this
discussion.

The first of these powers, and by far the most important, is in the
area of third party or neighborhood effects .

Third party effec t s arise

because all of the water appropriated and applied to a beneficial use is
not consumptive l y used, and therefore much of the excess amount finds
its way into other uses and supply sources, and benefits and/or costs
accrue to others.

While the courts have ruled th at a person may not

acquire a ri ght to have return flow kept up, when that water finds its
way back to a natural stream

54

it may again be sub j ec t to appropriation. 55

This seepage and r e turn flow may we ll be the basis of another man ' s
water right.

54
The t erm 11 natural stream " would be s ubj ect to court de termination.
Brian v. Fremont Irrigation Company speaks of surplus water reentering
the " stream from which it was taken. 11

55

433 .

clark v . North Cottonwood Irrigati on and Water Company, 79 U.R.
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Since any c hange in use or poin t of diversion is likely t o affect
these rights, the law r e quires the s tat e engineer' s approval t o effec t
any cha nge .

Thi s is an attempt t o protect pro pert y rights which i s cer -

ta i nl y a n important r esponsib il i t y of the law.

But this sec urity guar -

an t ee d by the l aw, need not result in a decrease of flexibility.

The

mea ns of overcoming thi s di sparit y i s provided for in the l aw i tself .
The l aw provides that a n application to effect a change in use or
point of dive r sion nee d not be re j ec t e d so l e l y because o f adverse third
party effe cts.

I f the conf lict of rights can be se ttle d by the disput ing

parties, the state engineer i s instructed to approve th e application.
This wo uld necessitate negotiations, not only between the t wo primary
parti es , but also the third parties as t o the amount of compe nsation

necessary t o cover the loss of productivity that will e nsue by all ow ing
the transfer.

Neverth e l ess, those parties affec t e d, not an agency in

the sta t e governmen t, are making the f inal decision .

The ro l e of th e

state e ng ineer should be to aid in the determination of the third party
effec ts and l eave the decision as to the compensa ti on and whe the r or

no t t o effect the trans fe r t o the parties concerned .

The cour ts would

stand in reserve, a s they now do, to rule on any claim of inequit y

brought before it by the nego tiating parties.

Howeve r, this sol ut ion

to the problem of third party affec ts has not been frequently us ed.
The question of equitable compensation must be consid e red in a

discussion of third party effe cts.

While a wat e r transf e r may adversely

affect rights in the area of or i g ina l use, beneficial effe cts may a l so
accrue in the area where th e water is tran sferred, the ne t ef fect on th e
entire communit y concerned being approximately ze r o.

The question ari ses

as to why the party wishing t o trans fer a right should be entirely res-
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ponsible fo r comp ensating adve rse third part y effec ts, withou t receiving
at the same time reimbursement for third party ga ins in the n ew area .

If all effects are adverse, the n eff ici ency wou ld require that the trans fer be able t o carry th ese losses, or the trans fe r should not be made.
But since this is seldom the case, perhaps society should bear th e cos t
of compensating third party loss e s and attempt to capture the be neficial
effects that wi ll accrue t o new use rs.

It i s r easonabl e to assume that

incr eased productivity wil l r es ult from additional wat e r, incr e a s ing

propert y valuation and even tuall y s tat e tax receip t s .

Even if compen-

sa tion is impractical, th e determination of ga in s and loss es is necessary

to decide if th e transfer i s really economical for th e e ntir e community.
Another discre tionar y power ves t ed in the state engineer allows him
to deny an application to appropriate water if, after initial inves tiga -

tions, he believe s that granting th e application will r es ult in restricting a more benefic ial us e or prove de trime ntal t o the public welfare . 5 6
Again, no us e shou ld be g iv e n priorit y over any o ther use as l ong as
societ y i s protected f r om such adve rs e effects as pollutio n .

Insofar

as the state engineer fo llows we l f are criteria and can acquir e the
requisit e information t o make a jud gement about social welfar e, the n
thi s discr e tionar y power may not be inefficient.

But use pri orit y of t e n

involves ot he r consid e ration s and may be econom ically inefficient .

A s urface examination of the activities of the Offic e of the Stat e
Engineer over the past few years indicated considerable r e lianc e on
economic c rite ria in reaching dec isions.

56

Utah Code, 73 - 3- 8.

This further supports the
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conc lu sion stated earlier in this paper that Utah water la"v is r easonabl y
conducive to economic allocation of the water

r e~o urce.

Regardless of the econom ic efficiency of the state engineer in the

past, the state has no guarantee that this will be the case in the future.
I f the future state engineers tends to be too legalistic, they may not
give much consideration to efficiency criteria in allowing changes in
use and point of diversion.

To avoid thi s, the discretionary powers

of the state need to be restricted in the above mentioned ways to insur e
economic efficiency in allocating the state's water resources.

Utah Water and Pm;er Board
Responsibilities of the Water
and Power Board
"To the end that every mountain stream and every water r esource
within the state can be mad e to render th e highest beneficial service, 1157

the State Legislature in 1947 created the Utah Water and Power Board.
An initial appropriation of $1,000 ,000 wa s mad e with the intent of
adding $1,000 ,000 each biennium until a revolving fund of $10,000,000
was achi eved.

The Board consis ts of a chairman and 13 other members

appointed f rom various water districts throughout the state. 58

In

addition the Board is authorized to employ engineers, legal counsel and
all other services it deems necessary.

57
58

utah Code, 73-10-l,
rbid., 73-10-2.
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The primary goa l of the Water and Po,.er Board is to achieve greater
utilization of ex isting supplies and developme nt of new sources.

His-

torically, the Federal Government has been most active in this phase

of water supply.

However, most projects undertaken by th e Federal Govern-

ment have been quite large and costly, such as the Weber Basin Project,
Provo River Project, and the Central Utah Project.

The sma ll communities

or ditch companies having need of a small reclamation project to achieve
greater utilization of water were without financial backing.

The Water

and Pmver Board attempts to remedy this situation by supporting development projects too small to get support by th e Bureau of Reclamation, Corp
of Engineers, or other Bureaus of the Federal Government.
To achi eve its objectives , the Board is empmvered to make detailed

studies and investi g ations of the water and power resources of the state .
The Board then makes recommendations upon projects which are in the best

interest of th e s tat e and the order in which these projects should be
undertaken. 59

When th e sponsors of a project, aided by the Water and

Power Board, ar e unabl e to ob tain fina ncial assistance from any other
source, the Board may advance sta t e funds from its revolving fund.
These projects are f inanced on a 100 percent reimbursabl e bas i s without

interest.

The repayment period of a l l funds provided by the Board shall

conform to th e needs and circumstances of the water users.

60

When any

project is financed by these s tate funds, the prOject r ema in s the pro -

perty of the state until s uch time as the loan is completely repaid.

59 Ibid., 73-10-4.
60

Statement of Policy of the Utah Water and Powe r Board, April 1963,
Article VIII, Section E., p. 5.
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The right to the use of the water to be derived from the project
must be appropriated by application to the state engineer.

The Board

is empowered to make this application and take all steps necessary to
perfect the right .

61

Once the project has been completed and the water right granted, the
Board administers the allocation of the water.

Those persons who, in

the opinion of the Board, can "best utilize " the water from the project,
are given right to its use.

They are in turn assessed a fee which is

"nec essar y and reasonable" for the maintenance of the project and will

return to the state the actual costs of the project. 62
The policy of the Board is to support water development regardless
of the type of sponsoring party.

However, if projects of equal merit

are submitted from individuals or groups, preference is given to t he
group enterprise .

63

A qualification of this statement concerns censer-

vancy districts or similar organizations with taxing powers.

Such

organizations will not rec e ive loans until the Leg islature so directs

and provides sufficient funds to make the loans.

64

This development program is unique among the western states and

many of the smaller projects originating from it have shown a greater
return per unit of investment than the larger, well known ones .

65

6lutah Code , 73-10-4.
62Ibid., 73 - 10 - 6.
63
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statement of Po l icy of the Utah Water and Power Board, p. 6.
Ibid., Section D.
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oeveloping a State Water Plan, A joint study by Utah State Univer sity and Utah Water and Power Board, March 1963, p. 51.
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The Water and Power Board has been spec i f ically desi gnat ed to make
studies, investigations, and the general r es ponsibility for planning all
water development in th e state as well as c oordinating these plans with
o ther s tat e operations.66

For examp l e, highway construction to the

exte nt that it affects any water course must be cleared through the
Water and Power Board.
Other obligations of the Board are varied but closely associated
with wa ter development .

SuperViSion and administration of compacts

affect ing interstat e rive rs, lake s , and othe r so urces of supply are res -

pons ibilities of the Board.

Whenever any age ncy of the state has ne ed

for water, such as the Department of Fish and Game to build a state
bird r efuge , application to the state enginee r for that water is to be
handl ed by the Water and Power Board.

67

The duties and powers of the Board, even though they are to be
lit era lly interpreted, do not in any way interfe re with the authority
of th e state engineer.

Evaluation of Water and Power Board

The Water and Power Board has no direct responsibility in all ocation of the water resource excep t within areas where a project is being

financed by the state f unds, and even then, only until the project loan
has bee n repaid.

The Board has its greatest impact on the efficiency

of s tat e water policy by granting l oans for developmen t purposes.

66Utah Code, 73 -1 0 -14 .
67

rbid. , 73 -10-4 .
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The requirement that loans be repaid 100 percent coincides with a
basic economic criterion that Penefits exc e ed (at least equal) costs.

Knowing that funds must be complete l y repaid, the sponsors of a project
would be unwilling to commit themselves to repayment of a project unless

they were fairly confident that the incr eased income resulting from the
project would exceed its cost.
Possible misallocation of resources mi ght result from the policy
of granting interest free loans if the only alternative to state finan cing is private capital.

In such a case the difference in the marginal

costs of the development project would be substantia l because of the high
interest rates associated with private loans.

A requiremen t by the Board

that interest shou ld be charged on their l oans, howeve r, would not
necessarily so lve this potential allocation problem.

Federal Government

loans do not require interest and in many cases include siz eab l e subsi dies.
Therefore, if the Water and Power Board were to charge interes t, misallocation as betwee n federal and state funds would result.

Close l y aliened to this question is one which asks if the Legislature is justified in appropriating $1,000,000 each biennium for sma ll
reclamation projects.

Any governme nt appropriation is subject t o con-

siderable controversy because of the difficulty of evaluating the marginal returns of social services provided by the gove rnment.

Perhaps

the dollar invested in the water development wou ld yie ld a greater
marginal return i f invested in libraries, educational fac ilities, high ways, tourist promotion, or any one of many possible areas of state res -

ponsibility.
lature .

This is a problem that must be decided by the State Legis-

Greater efficiency might be achieved, however, if those in the
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planning area as wel l as the State Legislature would take an increased
interest in evalu ating marginal returns, wherever possible, assoc iat ed
with alternati ve investment possibilities.

The planning and coordination of all water development could have
a significant effect on efficiency of state water pol ic y .

Past water

development has been conducted on some\vhat of a "hit or miss " basis .

Development of irrigational institutions, to be discussed later in this

paper, at t ests to that fact .

The duplication of facilities with i n Salt

Lake County alone must be extremely costly to the consumers .

By coopera -

ting with water institutions of all types and coordinating their development plans, considerable savings could be effected .

Water Pollution Control Board

Powers and duties of the Board
The Water Pollution Control Board is the mos t recent of the trio of
state agencies which have principal concern with water.

It was es tab-

lished by the State Legislature in 1953 to develop programs for the
prevention, control, and abatement of new or existing pollut i on of waters

in the sta te .

68

The Water Pollution Contro l Board consists of nine membe r s appointed
by the gove rnor for t erms of eight years.

69

Specific segment s of the

s t ate's economy must be r eprese nt ed on the Board, each of which might in

some way affect the pol lution of sta t e waters; the mineral industr y, food

68oeveloping a State Water Plan, p. 51.
69

utah Code, 73 - 14-3.
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processing industries, other manufacturing industries, munic i palities,
agriculture and livestock industries, and fish, wildlife and recreation

interests.

70

By law, the executive secretary of the Board must be the chief
sanitary engineering officer of the State Health Department.
may employ whatever persons it deems necessary.

The Board

However, technical,

legal, or other services should be performed, insofar as is practicable,

by personnel of the Department of Health and by other state departmen t s,
agencies and officers. 71
The powers and duties of the Board include any and all a c t ions
which may prevent or reduce pollution of state waters.

The Board sets

the standards of water quality and then works with existing agencies and
various in t erests which may in some way affect t hat standard .

They

have the power to restrict to any degree any action which they believe
will increase pollution. 72

The decision of the Board is binding upon

all parties unless appealed to a district court. 7 3
One of the primary tasks of the Board is to work with mun i cipal i t i es,
industries, or others to cons tr uct or improve exi s t ing t reatment works

and other remedia l measures to prevent po ll ution. 74

70
71
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Ibid . , 73 -1 4- 4.
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The polic y of the Board thus far has been to urge a cooperative,
voluntary program of pollution control rather than one of rigorous
enforcement.

75

Recently the Board has given serious consideration t o

a policy to emp lo y some of their police powers and force municipalities,

industrial firms, and others to take conclusive s t e ps t o end pollution
of state waters.

Evaluation of Water Pollution
Control Board
This Board has at present only related interes t in allocation and
distribution of state waters .

It is therefore impossible to evaluate

its operation under the criteria developed fo r this study.

Neverthe l ess,

water pollution is of growing concern throughout the United States.
Pollution studies are in progress on most of the ma j or rivers in the
eastern United States and some in the West.

This concern has developed

because of popu lation growth as well as increased industrial produc t ion
have resulted in serious pollution of our waters.

To make ma t ters worse,

there ha s been widespread r efusal or neglect by po lluting parties to
voluntarily take steps to ease th e problem.
In esse nce, water pollution is a pr oblem of "neigh borhood effects . 11
Just as a person cannot utiliz e his own property in a manner that will
inflict discomfort or lo ss on those around him, ther e is ju stificat i on

for restraining the upstream user from polluting the water supply of
those below him.

75
League of Women Voters, Utah Chapter, "Water Resources: Support
of Measures to Promo te Comprehensive Regional or River Basin Planning
with the State," August, 1960, p. 2 .
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Although this problem is not yet the most serious one in Utah, con cern is growing .

The prospects of increased industrialization and popu -

lation growth are increasing this apprehension.

It may well be that

future problems of allocation and distribution will be just as co nc erned
with water quality as wanter quantity.

If so, the Water Pollution Control

Board will assume a very important role in allocating the state's wa ter
resources.

Metropolitan Water District

The institutions discussed thus far exist at the state level, and
as suc h, are concerned with the overall management of the state ' s water

r esources .

In addition to these there are several different types of

institutions f unction ing at th e local level to develop, a ll ocate, and
distribute water to the water users in the sta t e.

The metropolitan

water district is such an institution.

Pr epara ti on and passage of the

Metropolitan

\~ater

Di s trict Act

The recurring water shortages in Salt Lake County during the early
1900' s and the inability of existing political structures t o take any
significant steps to alleviate future problems, set the stage for crea tion of an institution capable of guaranteeing adequate development
of water supplies and future needs.

In 1931 E. 0. Larsen, District

Engineer of the United States Bureau of Reclamation, in his feasibility
report recommending construction of the Deer Creek Proj ec t, also sugges t ed
the format ion of a metropolitan wa t e r d i strict mode l ed after the Met r o -

48
politan Water District of Southern California. 76

This suggestion coin-

cided with considerable public sentiment to the effect that any effective water program could only be accomplished within the context of an
independent water hoard, which would not be subject to change with city
administration.

77

The Metropolitan Water District Act was presented to and passed by
the State Leg islature in 1935.

78

Later in the same year , the State

Supreme Court returned a decision that the new Act was constitutiona1.

79

The Metropolitan Water District Act provides for the creation of a
district within the corporate boundaries of any one or mor e municipali-

ties.

The primary purpose of a district is to provide for the water

needs, both present and future, of all

of the district .

\Vater

users within the boundaries

Creation of a district in the last analysis rests with

the peop l e within the pre scribed area of jurisdiction.

Initially, the

le gis lative body of any municipality may pass an ordinance declaring:
(l) the intention to organize a metropolitan water district, (2) the
names of the cities to be included in the proposed district, ( 3) the
name of the proposed district, and (4) the cost to each city of organiz ing a district.

80

Once passed this ordinance must be passed upon by the

76Harris , 100 Years of Water Develo pment, p. 42.
77Ibid . , p. 42-43.
78
79
80

La,,s of Utah, 1935.
Harris, 100 Year s of \~ater Develo pment, p. 44.
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legislative bod i es of those municipa l ities to be inc lud ed in th e distri ct.

81

The ques tion must then be submitted to th e e l ec t or at e of those
municipa lities whose legislative body favored creation of a district. 82
I f a ma j or it y of the e lector s of any one or more of the municipa litie s
in question vo t e affirmatively, a district wi ll be formed .

The Sec retar y

of State wi ll issue a cer tif ica t e of inc orporation c r e ating th e district

wh ich wil l sta t e the name of th e district and the muni c ipalities which
will be included.

83

Administration of a metropolitan water district i s ves t ed in a
board o f directors, with a r e presentative for each municipality, appointed

by the l egis lative bod y of each respective c ity.

Eac h r e pre s e ntative

is e ntitl e d to one vote for each t e n million do ll ars of assessed valua tion of pro pe rt y , provid e d that e ach r e pr ese ntative has at l eas t one
vot e.

The aff irmative vote of members r e presenting mor e than 50 pe r-

cent of th e vo t es i s necessary to carr y any r eso lution coming befo r e

the Board.

84

When a d i strict encompasses only one municipality, th e Board is to

cons i st of either five or seven members , t o be decid ed upon by the le g is lat ive body of the ci t y, a majority being necessar y t o carr y a resolutio n.

81
82
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The t e rms of office of a dir e ctor is six years. 85
The primar y purpose of a metropolitan \Vater district is to acquire,

appropriate, de ve l op, store, sel l, l ease, and otherwise distribute wa t e r
for munic ipal and domestic purposes, irrigation, power, industrial and

all other bene f i cial uses.

86

To accomplish this goal, th e district must

take steps to obtain a supply of the water resource and facili ties t o
put tha t water to be specified beneficial uses.

A district is empowered

to take by grant, purchase, bequest, or lease, and to hold, lease, sell
or otherw ise dispose of water, water works, water rights, and sources

of water s uppl y and any real or personal property of any kind within or
without the district necess ary or convenient to the fu ll exercise of its
powers.

87

Especially in the beginning it is often necessary for a district to
assume bonded indebtedness or a contractual obligation to acquire a

water supply and/or build the works necessary to service and di stribute
that s upply.

When necessary, a district may incur indebt e dness not t o

exceed 10 pe rcent of the value of taxable property within the district.
They may also e nter into contracts with some agency of the Federal
Government or any private corporation for construction of necessary

works .

88
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Re venue for financing operati on of the district, prov ide for repairs
and depreciation of \vorks, pay the in t er est on any debt, and provide a
sinking fund for payment of the principle, ar e to come from sales of
water, insofar as it i s practical and possib l e .

The directors are re-

quired to fix r ates to accomplish this purpose . 89

When r eve nue from

wa t er sales are insuffici ent, a district has the power to tax without
limitation so far as necessar y to in s ur e the payment of an obligation
due the United States but otherwise no t to exceed 2 . 5 mil l s .

90

The principal customers of a di s trict are municipal water de partment s a nd othe r agencies already establi s he d ,;hose primary purpose is
to provide wate r services for their r espec tive cities .
sold to industry and some fo r a gr icultural uses.

Water is also

An important prov ision

of the law is that giving pri ority to domestic and municipal uses.
Agriculture has priority over industry.

91

Priority is also given any water uses or users within the district
over t hose outside.

At any time the board of directors can suspend th e

contract, l ease , or other type of a gr eeme nt with a user outside th e
district by \Yritten n otic e one year in advance.

92

A di s trict, just as any other political subdivison o f the state,
h as the power of eminent domain and must adhere to the state r e quir ements
f or compensation.

93
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Evaluation of metropolitan
wa ter districts

The passage of the Metropolitan Water District Act was an attempt
to remove water development from the realm of politics and end the appar ent diseconomies that prevail when several smal l, neighbor ing communi -

ties attempt to deve lop their wa ter supplies independent of each other.
While it does not seem to have been a specific goal of the originators
of the Act, a metropolitan water district can (or could) e ff ect great
ga ins in efficiency by breaking down intercommunity tr ans fe r restrictions.

To ac hi eve th e maximum eff icienc y possible, a district would

have to r eq uir e that water be allocated in such a way that the value of
the marginal pr od uct of wa t er in all uses is eq ual.
The act provides, with cer tain limitati ons, that a district could
act as a retailer, owning or at l e ast controlling a supply of water, and

sell it to whomeve r it wishes.

This would grea tly facilitat e f ree

transfers of water among uses and users within the community.

Any use

or user co uld obtain a wa t e r s upply by applying for such t o the district
and, if necessary, bid that amount of water away from a use of lower
productivity.

I f several municipalities can be encompassed within a

district, the additional eff iciency gains of optimum distributi on of
water among mun ic ipaliti es , as we ll as among users within a municipality,

can be achi eved .
The limit a tions, pr ev i ously mentioned, are in the form of a system
of priorities and reduc e the potential efficiency of a metropolitan water

district.

Giving priority to use s within the district and prov iding

that any outside user could have his supply cut off in one year ' s time,
results in ineff icient discrimination, and possibly underinvestment in
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outside uses.

The users outside the district would be unwilling to

inve st in water works necessary to fully utilize water available from the
district with such a risky supply.

By guaranteeing compensation to cover

the investment costs which are lost due to cancellation of a water con -

tract (the Act is silent on this point) security could be increased,
but this would not be likely to completely mobilize water delivery to
outside users.

Maximum efficienc y dictates that all users, within and

without the district, be treated the same.

The Act also specifies priorities as be tween municipal, agricul-

tural, and indu strial uses.
the municipal supply .

Again this was probably done to protect

As was pointed out earlie r in the section on

water law, in a rapidly changing world, any system of priorities can be
damaging to efficiency.

In a marke t al loc ation if domestic use deserves

first priority, domestic users wi ll bid water away from ot he r users,
in which case the priority would be redundant.

As demand for a given

water supp l y increases, the market can most efficiently dictate which use

has the great est value.

It seems apparent that industry will not wish to

purchase water if the value of the marginal product is less than the cost
of acquiring it.
Since a metropolitan water district is primarily a distribution
institution, its method of pricing the water has considerable consequence

on the effic i ency of a district.

The actual method of pricing t o be used

is a decision of the district management .

A la ter section on the munici-

pal water departments discusses pricing methods that might be employed
in more detail.

By providing that re venue, for th e most part, should come from the
sale of water, the Act is adhering to the concept that those who receive
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the service should pay the bill.

In addition, there is some justifica-

tion for a small tax levy to cover some of the district's costs.

Every-

one wi thin a district, no matter how much o r little water they use, receives some benefits from the program.

Incr ease in property valuation

because of an adequate supply of water is one possible way.

However,

this should not be a major source of revenue and one would wonder if a

2.5 mill levy under normal conditions and the possibi lit y of an unlimited
tax levy to repay an obligation due the United States were not somewhat
greater than a small tax levy.
As is often the case, what could be accomplished and what actually
takes place in reality, are considerably divergent.

The metropolitan

water districts have increased efficiency, but their full potential has

not been reached.

The best example of this discrepe ncy is the largest,

best established metropolitan water district in the sta te, the Metro -

politan Water District of Salt Lake City.
Established in 1935, soon after the creation of the Metropolitan
Water District Act, the Salt Lake District was intended to join cities

of South Salt Lake, Sandy, Holladay, Murray , and others wi th Salt Lake
City for the purpose of water development.

This goa l was never realized

because of a provision in the origin al law regarding voting procedure.

94

This provision stated that when two or more muni cipali ties joined together
to form a distric t , no one of the municipalities could have more votes

than all others on the board combined.

This would have enabled the

small suburb cities to out - vote the control city.

It is understandable

94 The origina l provisio n was ammended to its present status in 1957.
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why Salt Lake City was unwilling to accept this voti ng r e quirement.
What i s difficult to see is why some attempt was not made to change the
law rather than organize a district completely out of harmony wi th the
purpose of the Act.
The ar ea of jurisdiction of the Salt Lake City District is the cor porate boundari es of Salt Lake City.

The district' s water supply comes

from rights owned in the Deer Creek Div ision of the Provo River Project,
th e water being transported to Salt Lake City by means of a huge aqueduct.

While some service is given outsid e th e district, Salt Lake City

is the distri c t' s principal customer.

In fac t , Salt Lake City has paten-

tial claim on all water held by the distri ct.
Salt Lake City and the Metropolitan Water Di s tric t duplicate each
o ther in many ways.

Both have supply lines, water processing facilities,

maintenanc e men to maintain existing facilities, office staff to manage

operations and water sa l es, a nd the physical plant of the office its elf .
For all practical purposes the Me tropolitan Wat e r District duplicates
through anot her organi za ti onal laye r what Salt Lake Cit y cou ld have done
and stil l does by itself by amending city statutes t o allow the city to
accept t he amount of indebtedness necessar y t o subsc rib e f or 50,000 acre

feet of Deer Creek Reservo ir water. 95

It is intuitively apparent that

such duplication can l ead only to inefficiency.

I f only the f unction of

the two offices could be combined, efficiency would be increased.

95
Rene Ballard, "The Salt Lake Metropolitan Water District," Utah
University Institut e of Gove rnment, Vo l . 1-10, bull e tin no. 5 (Salt Lake
Cit y: University of Utah, December, 1958), pp . 14 -1 5.
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It seems , h owever , t ha t some inefficienc ies will always exist in a
metropolitan water district.

Water fo r munic ipal-d omest ic use, by the

v er y nature of the o rganization, will al wa ys r ece ive f irst priority no
matter what changes in the law are enacted o r what preventive measures
are taken .

Th e institutions to be discussed n ext could overcome this

obstacle and still insure municipalities of an adequat e wat e r supply.

Water Conservancy District

In 1950, the f ir st conservancy district, the Weber Basin Water
Conservanc y Di str ict, was organized to ad mini s t e r part of the wa ter to

be deve lop ed by th e Weber Basin Project.

In 1951 the Salt Lake County

Water Cons e rvati o n Distri c t was organiz e d to h e lp mee t the e xpanding
water needs of that c o unty.

Since that time th e r e have been seve ral

more districts fo rme d, mostly in connection with larg e reclamation pro-

j ects.

Some of thes e projects, such as the Central Utah and Dixie pro-

ject s are still in the planning and constructio n stages and the conser vancy districts es tablished in connection with them have only been able
to function t o a limi t e d degree thus far.

Eve n the We ber Basin Conser-

vancy Di strict ha s not fu nctioned t o its fu ll capaci t y since the project
is n o t yet complete and the Bureau of Rec lamation maintains conside rable
control over its ope ratio ns.

Eve n so, the Weber Basin Di strict and the

Salt Lake County District represent the two types of institutions established under the Cons e rvancy Act thus far.

Each has faced many of the

problems associat e d with the allocation of water on a multiple - use basis,
and theref o re, will serve as illustrations, wherever applicable, of the
potential of a conservancy district .
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Organization and responsibi lities
of a conservancy district

In many ways the Water Conservancy Act and the Metropolitan Water
District Act are very similar.

Indeed, a reading of the two documents

reveals whole sections that are identical while many are altered only

slightly.

The primary difference seems to be an expanding of a single-

use institution to one of multiple-use characteristics.
Under the Water Conservancy Act the district courts are vested

with the power to establish a conservancy district upon fulfillment of
specific conditions, to be discussed below.

This Act does not, however,

confer upon the court any responsibility for administration or adjudica-

tion of water rights beyond those duties already specified by Utah law. 96
Establishment of a district requires a petition be filed by land
owners within the area proposed for the new district.

The petition must

set forth a general description of the purpos e , contemplated improvements,

the territory to be included, and a proposed name for the new district.

97

Anyone opposing th e es tabli s hment of the district may file a protest
pet ition which wil l be duly considered and e ithe r accepted or rejected
at a hearing to consider the original petition.

I f the protest petition

fa ils and the original petition is in complete conformity with the Act,

the court shall declare the district organized and it will be recognized
as a political subdivision of the state of Utah with all the powers of

96
97

utah Code, 73-9-3.
Ibid., 73-9 - 4 .
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a public or municipal corpora tion .

98

The conservancy district is governed by a board of director s ,
app o int e d by the district cour t , each s e rvin g terms of thr ee years .
Employees of the district include a secre t ary, who may or may no t be a
member of the board, and what eve r engineers, attorneys, and oth er per-

sonne l a r e deemed nec essar y by the board. 99
A water conse r vancy distr ict, once created, ha s much broader interests and r esp onsibilitie s than most wate r ins tituti ons in the stat e of

Utah.

The ge neral purpose and goal of the Water Conservancy Act are to

develop and cont rol all unapp r opri ated water of the state and to obtain
from that water the highest duty possibl e . lOO

These goals indicate res -

ponsibili t y not on l y t o many users, but als o to seve ral us es .

To achieve

this broad go al the cons e rvancy district both wholesales and re tails
water for domest ic, agricultural, industr ial, and all other beneficial
purp oses.
A district may incur indebtedne ss for th e cons tructi o n of wha tev er

facilitie s the bo ard deems necessary to comple t e l y acc omplish the goals
of the district .

However, a majority vote of a ll property owners within

t he di s trict i s necessar y before incurring any debt.

101

A co nservanc y district ha s the power t o tax up to a maximum of one

mill on the do llar of assessed propert y va luation within the district

98Ibid., 73-9-6; 73-9-7 .
99Ibid . , 73 -9-10; 73-9-7.
lOOibi d., 73 -9-l.
101 lbid., 73-9 - 35 .
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under normal conditions to help finance the operation and maint enance of

th e system. 102

An additional one -hal f mill may be l evied whenever the

system is unable to punctually pay the annual installments on its con -

tract or bonds or interest thereon. 103
Of initial importance in the devel opment of a conserv ancy district

is the water right to a supply which can be distributed and allocated
to prospective users.

In general a district can obtain its water supp l y

in any of the several ways provided by Utah law.
The method most common ly used thus far has been to contract with
some agency of the Federal Governmen t for the construction of necessary
wa t er works.

Actually, the above statement is not altogether true since

the general procedure is to es tablish a conservancy district in connec tion with a large reclamation project.

However, the end result is the

same, the district administers the waters to be developed by the pro -

j ect and is responsible for repayme nt of the obligation due th e United
States.

104

The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District emp l oye d other
means to gain its water supply.

Those sources are:

(l) wells obtained

by application to the state enginee r, (2) spr ing wate r obtained by purchase of shares in an irrigation company having water rights to that

source, and (3) wholesale purchase of finished water from the Metropolitan

lOZibid., 73-9 -1 6.
103 rbid. , 73-9-20.
104 seven Year Summary of the Weber Basin Conservancy District;

June 1950 to Decemb er 1957, p. 3.
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Water District of Salt Lake City.l05
Since the possible tax levy is relatively low, the primary source

of revenue open to the district is the sale of water.

In keeping with

this, water is sold to municipal, industrial, agricu l tural, and any
other be neficial use .

Allocati on of the water supply
The ability to use water within a district is obtained by application which must present all pertinent information, including

~arne

of

applicant, quantity and quality of water desired, description of use,
and an agreement to pay the price per unit of water decided upon by the
board as well as other rules and regulations of the board.

106

The boar d, at its discretion, may accept or r e ject any application,
its criterion being the best interest of the district .

107

Once accept e d,

the district will enter into a specific contract with the applicant,

depending on the nature of the intended use and quality of water needed.
Thus far the largest customers of the conservancy district, like
the metropolitan water district, have been the municipalities themselves

and the institutions already established withi n the municipalities t o
serve the needs of citizens.

the needs of both parties.

The district negotiates a contract to meet

Contracts can be negotiated for any number

of years , although the general polic y has been to establish the length
of the contract to cover the period of indebtedness incurred during the

105
water: Our Eve r Growing Need (Report of Salt Lake County Water
Conservancy District, Salt Lake City, Utah, 19 62) , p. 12.
l06u tah Code, 73 -9-19.
lO?Ibid.
lOBrbid .
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initial deve l opment. 109

The price to be paid for the water , to be deter -

mined by the board , is part of the contract.

That price can be changed

at any time, but if increased, the contracting party has the o ption to
cancel or continue the contract.

110

A district can retail water to domestic as well as industrial users
within its boundari es provided that, in the case of domes tic use, th e
user is not serviced by any munici pa lity which was incorporated at the

time of the district's creation. lll

Applications and contracts for these

uses of water are substantially the same as those for municipalities.

\...

A statement made many times in the Water Conservancy Act is that
rates and charges shall be " equitable although not necessarily equal or
uniform for like classes of service throughout the district. , ll 2

This

s tatement , whi le included in the specification of all types of water

sales, has its most gene ral application in sales to irrigation us ers.
Under the Conservancy Act, irri gation users must app l y for wa t er
and enter into contract with a district the same as other users, agreeing

to pay the price determined by the board.

113

The Salt Lake County Dis-

trict has only one class of water, the price of which is too gr eat to

109
rnterviews with Wayne M. Winegar, Manager of Weber Basin Conservancy District, July 15, 1965, and Rober t B. Hilbert, Manager of Salt
Lake County Conservation District, July 28, 1965.
110
111
112
113

rbid., Hilbert.

utah Code, 73 - 9-19; 73 -9-13.
rbid., 73-9-17; 73 - 9-19.
rbid., 73-9-18.
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induce purchase by agricultural users.
considerable water for irrigation.

The Weber Basin District fur nishes

That water is priced in relation to

th e additional production than can be generated by the increased water
s uppl y, as computed by the Bureau of Reclamation.

This has resulted in

ex tr emely low prices for irrigational water, much lower than the price

for the same water when sold to industry .

114

There i s also a limit set by the Bureau as to the amount of water
that will be supplied for irrigated land.

This figure is supposed t o

represent the maximum amount of water necessary for agricultural produc-

tion within the district .

The district may only supp ly each irrigator

with enough water so that his total supp l y, other water sources included,
will not exceed that figure.

At present, in the Weber Basin District

3 acre-feet per acre is the maximum. 11 5
Evaluati on of th e water
conservancy district
The water conservancy di str icts that can be created under the Water

Conservancy Act have great potential in efficiently allocating wa t e r.

Of

course, like all political institutions, the conservancy district may

not be comp l etely efficient , from an economic point of view.

The following

discu ss ion will attempt to point out the features which ar e conducive to
eff ici e nc y as well as discuss the obstac l es to eco nomic eff ici e ncy in

operation today.

114 rnterview with Winegar .
11

\bid.

63
Unlike most water institutions in the state, a water conservancy
district is not es t ab li shed to serve one particular use; e . g ., met rop o litan water districts for domestic uses and irrigation companies for agricultural use.

Its boundaries are set to include all uses and users

within a common area.

This enab l es the district to allocate water between

uses without priorities and discriminatory quotas and pricing.

Inef ficiency can result whe n distric t policy toward negotiating
contracts for wa t e r use is too inflexibl e .

As previously noted, con-

tract s can be nego tiat ed for any l e ngth of time acceptable to both parties,
but the general procedure has been to contract for the length of indebted ness.

The r e ar e indications that the Weber Basin Conservancy District

has been reluctant to deviate from this policy. 116

Persons needing

water have been willing to obligate themselves for 60 years, the life
of the district bond.

In years when they haven't nee ded the e ntir e

quantity provided by their contract, they are restrained from trading
or selling that water to some other user, even if facilities exist to
initiate the transfer .

This tends to make water appurt e nant t o the land

once a contract has been negotiated.
It is true, the con tracting party realizes his ob ligati on when initia -

ting the contract.

But the future i s replete wi th many kinds of uncer-

tainties that produce changed conditions .

Flexibi lit y in water use by

subcontracting wou ld seem to increase use efficiency.

Besides, the

district would be no worse off as long as that particular quantity of
water i s paid for as stipulated in the initial contract.

116

rnterview with Winegar.

These inflexible present allocations cannot be laid entirely at
the feet of the district directors.

Sinc e the Weber Basin River Proj ect

is stil l under construction, much of the control of district water is

in the hands of the Bureau of Reclamation.

In addition, the district

is having difficulty selling enough water to meet its obligations, a
problem to be discussed directly later in this section.

Apparently

those responsible believe that be refusing to allow these transfers,

and se lling or renting additional water to the consume r desiring additional water, that revenue will be increas ed.

This will probably not be the case.

If the buyers know that sub-

contracting is impossib l e and that they themselves will have to pay for
the water which they contract to receive, no matter what ci r cumstances

prevail, they will be unlikely to offer as high a price as they would
i f greater flexibility were permitted.

In fact, it seems that if con-

tracts were negotiable throughout the period of the contract, a large

amount of uncertainty could be overcome.

This flexibility would give

a large boost to more and larger contracts, and therefore, revenue would

be increased.

The Salt Lake County Conservancy District, on the other hand, has
exhibited much more flexibility in negotiation contracts .

While their

indebtedness runs for 50 years and most of their contrac ts are for that

period of time, they have been willing to meet the needs of any user.
Emergency con tracts have been negotiated whi ch offer no guaran t ee that
the district will furnish any wa t er if supplies are short, or that
obligate the consumer to purchase any wa t er from the district.

Water

will be made available upon demand so long as the district fee ls there is

65

a suffici e nt amount of water in its system to meet other contracts.

117

The flexibility with which water transfers can be made and the security against tenure unc ertainty granted in the contract seems to be dependent on those initiating the contracts rather than being contained in
the Water Conservancy District Act itself.
Since a conservancy district must rec eive the bulk of its revenue
from water sales, an admirable requirement of the Act, the pricing policies of a district play a mo st important role in determining its economic efficiency.

The districts are relatively f r ee to choose their own

methods of pricing and again, as has alr eady been stated, a detailed
discussion of the pricing methods most commonly used in Utah is contained
in a later section of the thesis.

There seems to be, however, a signifi-

cant problem within the conservancy districts that will require at least
some di scussion of pricing policies here.
Optimum efficiency in pricing r equires that the same price be charged
for each unit of wate r consumed and that the price be the same for all
users.

Th e stateme nt made througout the Act that rates and charges

shall be "equitable although not necessarily eq ual or uniform for like
classes of service throughout the district," is in direct vio l ation of
this requirement.

If prices are not the same to all users, the value of

marginal utility of water to all users will not be equal in equilibrium,
result ing in inefficient allocation of water .
This statement in the Act does not require a district to price discriminately but certainly leaves the door open fo r the districts to do

117
records.

Interview with Robert Hilbert and examination of some district
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A case in point is the Weber Basin Conservancy Di s trict. 118

as th ey desi r e .

The Weber Basin District both who l esales and r e tails wate r to munici pal industrial, agricultural, and other be ne ficial users, throughout the
countie s of Weber, Davis, Morgan, and part of Summit.

diff ere nt price is es tablished.

For each use, a

This is justifiable to the extent that

the difference in pric e reflects the difference in cost of supplying
the users.

For instanc e, water so ld to industry is approximately half

the price of water to municipalities, the difference being the cost of
f inishing th e wa t e r, since industrial usage does no t always require high

quality water.

Considerable inefficie nc y is ev id en t, howeve r, when

irri ga tional us e is considered.
As \4as earlier pointe d out, the price of water for irrigation is

dependent on the increased productivity gene rat ed by the increased
water supply, as computed by the Bureau of Reclamation.

This price is

considerably below th e price set for industrial users utilizing th e same
quality of water.

This r es ults in a subsid y t o agricultural users and

an ineff icie nt allocati on of the wat e r r esource.
Optimum pricing i s f urth e r restricted by the pr esence of a "quota"
system on wate r for agricu ltur e which wou ld prevent consumers f rom push ing consumption to the point where value of the marginal product eq ual s
marginal price.

As previously noted, th e We ber Basin District is unable to sell
enough wate r to meet its obligations due the Federal Government and its
bond ho ld ers .

118

At present, the y are supposed t o receive an additional 6,000

rnterview with Wine gar.
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acre fee t in 19 66 .

At the same time the number of new contracts for

water has not been increasing.

119

First observation would indicate that either the price is set too

high or supply far exceeds demand.

In the field of water development it

would be highly inefficient to produce only those uni,ts. of water needed
at th e present time.

Therefore, it is possible that supply, at least in

the short run, could exceed demand.

An inv es tigation of the municipali -

ties within the district, however, shows considerable interest in develop-

ing new supplies.

Many are drilling wells and some investigating the

possibility of building their own water purification plants. 120

Appar-

ent l y the demand fo r water is increasing right along with the supply.
The obvious alternative to lack of demand is too high a price.

The

users can produce their own water less expensively than they can buy
it from a district.

This explanation seems satisfactory until the pric-

ing policy of a similar institution is considered.

The Salt Lake County

Water Conservancy District, serving a similar market, charges municipali-

ties $12.50 more per acre foot and industrial users considerably more.

121

Even at their hi ghe r rates, the Salt Lake District has no trouble contracting water sales to meet increasing demand.

This comparison may be

misleading because the two markets are obviously not the same .

Never-

theless, it seems reasonable that some other factors, such as the greater

security associated with owning its own supply or inflexible negotiating

119 Ibid.
lZOibid.
121

rnterview with Hilbert.
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policies of the district may be causing this problem.
An interesting study would be to determine s t atistica ll y if the
ci t ies within the Weber Basin District can develop the ir own supplies
at a lower cost than by buying them from the Distri c t.

I f no t, wh at

exp l ana tion can be given fo r the rel uctance of these municipalities t o
contract for Weber Basin water?

The Water Conservancy Ac t has gr eatly expanded t he pote ntial fo r
efficient a l location of water.

A conse rvancy dis trict has the advantage,

like the metropo lit an water district, of traversing lar ge areas, fac ilita-

ting transfers within that area.

The conservancy di s trict has the adde d

advantage that no priority system is written into th e Act.
vantage of the district i s it s l ow t axing power.

Another ad -

This should fo r ce it

to r e l y more on a market al l oc ati on of water and att empt t o maximize the
r ent on the water s uppli es it control s .
The wate r conservancy district coul d be the best attempt, thus far,
t o r e move transfer restric ti ons a nd faci litat e g r ea t er f l exibi l ity and

overal l efficiency i n allocating wa t er.

At present these goa l s are no t

be ing fully achieved but the potential r emains fo r an efficiency - co nsci ous
management to i mplement .

The Mutual Irrigati on Company

Ocigin and deve l opm en t
The mutual irrigation company had its ori g in in the sma ll community
cana l built and us ed cooperatively by th e Mo rmon pionee r s .

Be ing iso-

l at e d from ot h e r communities and de pe nding grea tly on each other, l ocal
control of the ditches present ed no serious problems .

But as towns and

69
cities grew they came to incl ud e many inhabitant s who were no t farmers

and had little inter est in or eve n sympathy with farm ing operations.
Hence, for most ditches sepa rate organizations were eventually developed

to include only th e water users directl y involved.

122

The f ir s t irr iga tion company, the Pr ovo Canal and Irrigation Company, was inc orpor ate d by the Terreto rial Legislature in 1853 and was
grant ed a l l the powers of a corpo ration.

123

A few o the r companies were

established by th e Terr e torial Le gis latur e but ex tensive organi zati o n
o f suc h companies did not come until the water law of 1880 provided that
irrigation companie s could be formally incorporated under the corporat e

laws of the state fo r irrigation purpo ses. 124
Organization and practic es
The mutua l company consists of several wat e r us e rs utilizing the
same water system for esse ntially the same purpo se .

These organizations

may or may not be inc orporated depending upon th e demands made upon the

company and the co ngeniality of the membership.

Whe r e membe r ship is

large or wher e the organi zat ion might be s ub j ec t to liti gation, th ey

are us uall y incorporated.

122
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Hutchins, ,Mu t ual I rriga ti on Companies in Utah, pp. 16 - 18.
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Geo r ge Thomas, Th e Deve lopment of In s titutions Under Irrigation
(New York: The MacMillan Comp any, 1920), p . 48.
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Hutchins, Mutual I rri gati on Compan ies in Utah, p. 24.
125
orson W. Israe ls e n, e t al., Irrigation Companies i n Ut ah: The i r
Activities and Needs, Utah Agricultural Experiment Station Bu l letin 322,
March 1946, p. 11.
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It is very important to note that a mutual company is not, strict l y
speaking, a public institutiOn delivering water to a public use.

It is

a private , non-profit organization established t o supply wa t e r at cost

to members only.

As such, they are not subject to public control be-

yond those applicable to any other commercial enterprise in the state.
A board of supervisors or other public body has no power t o fix rates or
charges of the company .

Nor can a company be forced to supply water to

anyone not owning stock in the company .

12 6

The company assets include ditches, canals, laterals, reservoirs,
and other works necessary to deliver water to the members.

More impor-

tant, the water rights are owned in most cases by the company .

Each

member is entitled to receive the propor ti ona te share of water carried

by the company system which his stock bears to the capital stock of the
company.

The shares of stock held by each member, at least initially,

are dependent on any one or a combination of the following factors:

(1) the amount of capital or labor con tributed toward the initial construetion of the company facilities, (2) the quantity of water he ld by rights
tran sferred to the company, or (3) the number of shares purchased from
the company or other stockholders.
In a few cases the water rights are not owned by the company, but
are he ld by the members in the same manner as before the company was

formed.

In such a case the on l y function of the company is t o

means of transporting water from its source to point of use,

pro~ide

This system

has not proven conducive to a flexible wa t er market and today is the

126
Weil, Water Rights in the Western States, Vol. II, p. 1159.

71
exception rather than the rule.

127

Even where water rights and other water works are held as assets
of the company, th ey are not managed the same as other corporations.

Instead of charging for the water furnished and applying the sale or
rental r evenues t o pay the maintenance and operationa l expenses and dividends on the stock, no charge whatsoever is made for water.

The expense

of management and maintenance of the company i s to be met by assessments

on the stock which may be paid in cash or lab or.
The stock certificate ent itles its owner to receive a portion of

water in the company which may be used at th e discretion of the stock holder on any lands which can be serviced by the company ditches.
Whether or not these shares of stock, representing water, may be bought,
sold, rented, or otherwise exchanged within the company, is a policy to

be decided upon by the stockholders.

Some companies require all trans-

fers of water to be made prior to the opening of the irrigation season
and permit no changes ther e after; others allow a change once during the
season ; still others permit changes more ofte n or have no r estrictions

whatever.

But all companies do allow stock to be tran sfe rred within

the company. 12 8
When transferring water between users the market va lue of the stock
or the price becomes the basis upon which such transactions are nego-

127

wells A. Hutchin s, Mutual Irrigation Companies in Ca lif ornia and

Utah Farm Credit Administration, Cooperative Division Bullet in 8,

(Wa shington , D. C. :
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October 1936), pp. 29-33.

Hutchins, Mutual Irrigation

Compan~es

in Utah, p. 40.

Irrigation Companies in California and Utah, pp. 54, 76, 124.
Irrigation Companies in Utah, p. 53.

Mutual
Israelsen,
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tiated.

Market value is a function of demand and supply, dependent upon

the forces at work in the market.
has a tendency t o rise.

When water supp lies are short, price

Expected high prices for farm products will

have the same effect .

Prices may be depressed by excessive precipita-

tion or early frosts.

In essence, the market value of the stock is

dependent on a combination of fac tor s which affect in some way the
supp l y of water or potential production associated with that supply.
The important point is that this value is variab l e and is determined by
those wishing to use the water in product ion. 12 9
Incorporation of the mutual company overcomes one of the serious
problems faced by the more informal organizations --c ollect i on of assess-

ments.

A Utah law allows the corporations to sell the shares of stock

upon which assessments are not paid.

130

This furnishes a strong induce -

ment to meet the assessments since much of the land in Utah, without
shares of stock representing water, is worth considerably less .
Management of a company rests with a board of directors selected

by the stockholders from the membership of the company.

Even though

corporate law places the minimum number of directors at three, the tendency is to have larger boards with five to seven members.

The directors

are e l ected for a one-year t erm and are responsible fo r all funct ion s
of the company, such as assessing th e stock and determinin g improvements
to be made.

129

The board may appoint a secretary-treasurer, water - master,

Hutchins, Mutual Irrigation Companies in Utah, pp. 34-36.
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and such o ther employees as may be necessary. 131
The fact that the mutual company has been so adaptab l e t o irrigation
problems in Utah has l ed to it s most serious shortcoming .

At f irst com-

muniti es were small and very fe'\v primary dtiches cou ld ad equat ely serve
all 'tvat e r us ers in th e area.

i nto a mutual company.

These situation s were r e ad i ly organized

As the state developed additiona l sett l ers would

move into the already we ll es tablished communities.

At f ir s t they were

readil y accepted and given shares in the company merely on the promise
that they would do some wo rk on the ditch in the f utur e .
became mor e fully utilize d, this policy change d.

As the supp lies

Rather than deve l op

new sup pli es and build new ditches, the companies mere l y r es tricted mem-

bership.

13 2

Thi s forced the organization and deve lopmen t of additiona l

companies to service acreages contiguous to th ose already being service d
by a mutual company.

Today it is not uncommon to have thr ee , four, f ive,

or even mo r e companies se rving one c ommon area.

In many ca ses severa l

ditches , e ach belonging to a di ffe rent company, of t e n run paralle l to
each o ther for several miles, resulting in excess land in dit c hes and
considerably greater wa t er l osses due t o seepage and eva porat i on.

Evaluation of th e mutual
irrigati on company

The degr ee of efficiency of the mutual irri ga ti on company depends
on whether th ey ar e eva luated individually or in r e lation to ot her companie s.

131

Consid ere d individually the mutual company offers perhaps the

Hutchins , Mutua l Irrigation Companies in Utah, pp . 34-36.

l3 2 Ibid ., p . 18 .
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best example of a flexible, market allocati on of water of any institu tion in the state.

Intracompany transfers can be made almost completely

at the discretion of the water user.
Security of tenure is no problem within a mutual company since

stock in the company is real property and can be lost only by the owne r's
own choice to sell or by failure to meet

assessment~,

which is in essence

also his own choice , since he realizes that delinquent assessmen t s could
result in lo ss of stock in the company.

Another desirable quality is that management of the district is
maintain ed by those who are directly concerned and acquainted with the
local probl ems .
By joining together to develop a common supp l y the early pioneers
increased the efficiency of the ir operations by spreading the cost of
bui lding and maintaining a water distribution facility over many indivi-

duals.

Also conveyance lo sses were reduced because of the use of a

common canal rather than separate canals of smaller dimensions.

Although

some savings have been r ealized, they have been and are considerably

less than they could have been had their members been able t o anticipate
the potential future growth of irrigation and expand rather than restrict their company's gr owt h.

Therein lies the primary ine ff ici ency

of the mutual company.
The re are, as of 1959, 967 mutual irrigation companies serving

1,178,034 of the 1,300,483 acres of irrigabl e land in Utah.

133

places an average of 1,218 acres of land under each company.

133united States, Census of Agriculture, 1959, p. 333.

This
This is a
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deceiving figure since some companies in the Del ta area, for example,

service a pproximatel y 20,000 acres each.

Therefore, the median acres

of land und e r each company would be considerably less than 1,211 acres ,
probably about 400 or 500 acres.

Whatever ther e exac t size may be,

severa l companies now service an area which could probably be more

efficient l y serviced by one mutual company.
Having stated that intracompany transfers can be easily made, it
must be remembered that maximum efficiency also dictates that wa t er

should be abl e to move to th e use of greatest marginal productivity.
This wou ld necessitate water being able to move t o any use or point of
use within a common area; i.e., between companies.

This condition is

no t widely achieved.
Utah law provides that one company may own shares of stock in an -

ot her135 but the articles of incorporation of most companies do not al l ow
this.

Even when provided for by the articles of incorporation, i t i s

not uncommon to charge an unrealistically high fee to transfer water into

another company ditch, further r es tricting flexibility .
The problem of f l exibil ity as between uses within an irrigation
company does not seem to be significant since very few companies sup pl y
water for household us e , other than lawn watering.

A mutual company may also have problems with sec urit y .

Security

against physical uncertainty is common in the smaller companies because
of their inability or reluctance to initiate ca pital investment in water
storage, ditch lining or other means of better utilizing a company ' s

135

utah Code, 73-l - 13 .
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water rights.
There are some pr ob l ems of tenure uncertainty arising between
companies.

Because many companies function in a common area, it is

inevitabl e that the actions a nd decisions of one company will affect
other companies on the same system.
tion.

This has l e d to extensive litiga -

The common law of Ut ah, with respect to water, has developed

almost exc lusively from su it s be tween mutual companies .

Litigation is

both expensive and time con suming and result s in waste of resourc es.
Th e r e is e vidence that mutual companies are moving to correct these in-

eff icienc es , primaril y by consolidation.

The number of mutual companies

i n Utah declined by 73 be t ween 1949 and 1959 . 13 6

This is even mor e

significant by noting tha t the number of inc or porate d compan i es actually

increased by 17 while unincorporated companies decreas ed by 90.

137

Even

wh e r e actual consolidati on ha s not been accomplished, some companies

have reached a stage where they are enjoying all the advantages o f conso lid a ti on except for a c tu al management.
There is, however, st ill co nsiderabl e oppos ition to the consolida -

tion of companies.

As e xplained in a paper by Dudl ey Crafts, this s t ems

partly f rom the particular nature of irri gation farming under mutual
irrigation companies.

138

The farmer is inter es ted in the company on l y as it
affects him pers onall y. He is primarily interes ted in
the wate r delivered to him at hi s headgate and his actions

136u. S., Census of Agriculture, p. 333.
137

138

Ibid.

nudley Crafts, "Pr ob l ems in t he Reor ganizati on of Irri gat i on
Companies in the Sevier River Basin, Utah. " (Unpublished paper)
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are governed by that in t eres t. He seldom refers to him self as a stockholder , but ra the r an owner of a water
r i ght within the company. That is why he wil l join
readily wi th other s and put fo rth an inc r edibl e effor t
t o build a re ser vo ir. He knows that the building o f the
r eservoir wi ll incr ease the quantity or dependability o f
th e wa t e r at his headga t e , or it might do bo th . But when
it comes to the actual de livery of water at his head gate
the more weight hi s voice carries the better. For this pur pose he t e nds to favo r sma ll organizations . He r egard s a
portion of the water owned by the company as his own pe rsonal prop e rt y and he wants to have as much to do with its
management as po ss i bl e . . . . Mos t of all the farme r wants to
protect hi s wate r r~ ght s. He f ee l s that thi s will best be
accompl ishe d by some one in hi s immediate ne ighborhood . . .
Ther e i s no gett ing awa y from the conc lu s ion that gen erall y sma ll mutual irrigation compani es ar e was t eful, ex pensive , a nd ineffic ient, but the farmer sticks by th em because he enjoys the fee ling that he is manag in g his own
affa ir s .139
Increased demand upon the wa t e r r esourc es of the state may force
mutual companies to sacrifice some of the ir independenc e for increased
e f f i c i e ncy.

If consolidation can be achieved, the mutual company could

well be the most ef ficient institution in the state for servicing a gri cultural users .

Irrigati on District s

Evolu ti on of the irrigation district
Irriga ti on (some times called water conservation) districts, as th ey
are provided for by Utah law, had the ir beginning in t he Utah Irrigat i on
Distric t Act of 1865.

This Act was an att empt to provide for grea t e r

deve lopme nt of wat er fo r irri ga tion by organizing per sons in a common
area, usu a lly a county or some part there of, into an ir r igation district .

139

Ibid . , pp. 33 - 34.
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Ditches , reservoir s, and other necessary works were to be built coope ra-

tively by the land owners within the distri ct and to be financed by taxes
placed upon the lands.

No provi sion for bondi ng was included. 140

Despi t e continued r ev isions of this statute, only a few di strict s

we r e organized and none of them were successful.
repealed.

In 1897 the Act was

141

Twelve years later in 1909 a new act was passed.

This legislative

move was in respons e to those 'l:vho want ed to fo ll ow along the lines of

the Wright Act of California and bond the land for con s truction of
res e rvoi r s, dams, and canals .

The legislation provi ding fo r irrigati on

district s in Ut ah toda y is an evolvement of thi s Act, having undergone
cons iderabl e amending.

142

Establishment of an irrigat i on district
Und e r the law a district may be formed i f and when the gover nor,
upon r e commenda tion of the State Engineer, or 50 o r a majority of land
owner s within the proposed dis t r ict, so request.

143

The request must

come in the form of a petit ion and state the proposed means o f water

sup pl y a s we ll as the name pr oposed for the district.

144

After pre-

liminary water surveys and allotments and after publi c i z ing the irriga -

140
14 1
142

Hutchins, Mutual Irrigation Companies in Utah, pp. 20 - 23 .
Ibid.

Thomas , The Development of Institution s Under Irrigation, p . 126.

143
Utah Code, 73 - 7-1 .
144

Ibid . , 73- 7- 2.
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tion district proposal, land owners within the proposed district decide
by public election \<hether or not a district \<ill be forme d.

145

Land

owners are entitled to one vote for each acre foot of water allotted
to th em with a majority of votes cast being necessary to creat e a dis-

tric t.

146

Management of the district resides in a three man board of directors
elected by popular vote of the water users within the district.

The

district will employ a secretary and whatever attorneys, agents or

employees that are required .

14 7

Generally, there is a particular water supply in mind for allocation
by the district 1vhen i t is proposed.

The district becomes the owner of

that right by application to the State Engineer and can construct or
acquire by contract purchase, or condemnation, canals, ditches, r eser voirs, res e rvoir sites, irrigation systems or works, and any other land

or facilities the directors deem necessary for attainment of th e di s trict goa ls .

The di strict may also use any of the above mentioned

methods to increase their water supply.

148

The law passed in 1909 differed substantially from the Irrigation
District Act of 1865 in only one way; the power to issue bonds.

Prior

to issuing bonds, th e dir ec tors must make an estimate of the amount of
money necess ary to enlarge or construct the system and submit all per-

145
146
147
148

Ibid., 73-7 - 3.
Ibid., 73-7 - 3; 73-7-4.
Ibid., 73-7-ll.
Ibid.
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tinent information to the wate r users in the district for considera-

tion . 149

After 20 days an election is held, t~<o -thir ds of all votes

cast affirmat i vely being necessary to authorize the bond issue.

150

Repayment of the bonds as well as the interest thereon and any
other maintenance or construction expenses not covered by th e bond
issu e is to be met by assessment levies against the land owners within

th e district.

151

Those assessments are in the form of a tax l evy and

are to be col l ected by the county treasurer in like manner to other
taxes.

152

These taxes constitute a first lien upon the property asses -

sed, providing for their sale to pay the taxes, if delinquent.

153

The

district may also fix rates of tolls and charges to be collected from
the land owners directly by the district to meet any additional expe ns es .
Allocation of district water
During the initial or gani zation of a district the State Engine er

is required to make an allotment of the available water supply to the
land within the district.

This allotment is supposed to represent the

maximum quantity of water which could be beneficially used on each tract

of land . 155

After organization is complete and the directors know the

l4 9 Ibid. , 73 - 7-14.
1 5°rbid.
151 rbid., 73 - 7- 17.
152
153
154

rbid., 73 -7-20.
rbid., 73-7-21.
Ibid., 73-7-24.

15 5Ibid . , 73 - 7- 2 .

154
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quantity of water availab l e within the district, they are to make a
revision of the water allotment, provided that they do not increase the

allotment made by t he State Engineer wi th out hi s perm i ssion. 156

An

exception to this rule can be made when additional water is obt aine d by

the di st rict. 157
When there is surplus water in th e district, the board of directors
may l ease or r en t the use of that wa t er to municipalities, corporations,
associations, or indi viduals wit hin or withou t th e district.

Howeve r,

no l ease or rental agreement may run for more than five years in time

and no vested r i ght t o the us e of that wate r will acc rue to the us e rs.

158

The Act also pr ovides that any land owner wi thin the district may
assign the who l e or any portion of the wa t er apportioned t o hi s land,
to any o ther land mvner within the district.

Such a transaction can be

a ccomplished only with the consen t of the board.

159

Miscellaneous provi sio ns of
irrigati on di s tricts
Genera ll y speaking, formatio n of an irriga ti on district offers a
mean s of organizing all water users within a g iv en area, even th ose not

wishing t o participate, into a cooperative e ffort to develop land for
irrigation.

15 6
157
158
159

The law does provide that any land owner wi thin th e dist ri ct

Ibid . , 73-7-11.
Ibid.

Ibid.
Ibid.
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may petition the district to exclude his land from the district. 160
The dec i sion to grant or reject such a petition rests with the directors,

the best interest of the district being their cr ite rion .

161

Similar

proce dures gove rn the inclusion of lands no t within boundaries of the

districts.

162

Evaluation of the irrigation district
For the most part irriga tion districts have no t been succ essful in

Utah.

In addition, there is little likeliho od that they will play much

of a role in the fu t ure, since any additional wa t e r development wi ll
probabl y take place under one of the more popular ins titut ions already in
opera tion.

Nevertheless an attempt will be made t o eval uate the potentia l

efficiency o f an irrigatio n district as they are provid ed fo r by law.
Pro bably the most advantageo us characteristic of an irri gation dis-

trict is that it makes possib l e a cooperat ive effort to de velop land and
wat er within a common area.

The boundaries of a di s trict may follow the

count y l ines or any part thereof , but would generally be larg e e nough to
i nc lud e al l land with i n an area depending on a common wa t er sour ce.

This would reduce duplication of effort and f acilities that have continually resulted when individuals or mu tual water compani es have developed water for irrigation.

Th e Act makes an atte mpt t o estab li sh f l ex ibilit y within a district
by providing that a wate r user c an assign the whol e or part of his water

160 rbid.' 73 - 7- 39.
161
Ibid .' 73-7-42.
162

rbid ., 73-7-29, 73 - 7- 34.

to another us e r .

This would he lp to establish a market within a dis-

trict si nc e the us er being able t o utilize wa t er to its greates t pro-

d uct i vity wo ul d be able to bid the resource away from other use r s .
Th i s appare nt flexib ilit y is r est ri c t e d somewhat, however, by a require-

ment that all suc h tran sactions must be approved by the board of direc tors.

Whether or not this pr oved to be a serious barrier t o f l exi bility

would depend on the a ttitud es of the wa t er us ers within the district since
they e l ect the board of direc t ors and actually se t s uch policies.
The security of tenure g ranted a water user is somewhat insecure be-

cause of the power granted the board of directors to reduce any land
owner ' s water allotme nt.

It is not likely, however, that the directors

would do this, except pr opor ti onat ely throughout the di s tri c t to compen sate for a varying quantity of water in the system.

Nevertheless, this

power is ves t ed in the board of direct ors.

Oth er uses within the district and all uses without have no security
beyond a f ive yea r cont ract.

In addition there are no provisions for

compensatio n t o cover investment if contract s are not renewe d.

This

cou l d r esult in substantial und erinvestme nt in ditche s and o ther wa t e r
works facilities necessary to achieve maximum productivity from th e wa t e r

s uppl y.
Eve n though this is a barrier to eff iciency, th e s ituati on i s much
improved ove r earlier l eg i s lation .

The initial l egis lati on providing

for irrigation districts prohibits them from l e asing or r e ntin g water to
any use or user ou t s id e the district or any use o ther than ag ri c ulture
wi thin the d is trict for a period of time greater than one year.

In

ad dit i on, the fee char ged mus t be one and on e - hal f times that ass esse d

against wate r us e rs within the district. 163

Irrigation district legis-

lation, at l eas t in this instance would satisfy Wantrup's c r i t erion that
the important point in resource allocation is movement toward a more
eff icient a ll ocation .
Another admirable feature of the irrigation district is that making
voting rights a function of water used.

Since the purpose of a district

is water development, this gives each land owner a say in the district
activi ti es proportionate t o the amou nt of his wa t e r allotment, one vote
per acre-foot of water .
Assessments are a l so t o be made in a like manner.

The board of

directors must dec ide each year h ow much money is necessar y to retire the
debt, pay the interest, and cove r o ther maint e nance and opera tion costs.
This amoun t is l ev ied equa ll y a ga inst each a c r e - foo t of wa t e r supplied.
This poli cy co uld result in maximum efficie ncy if the consumer (farmer)
were all owed t o push consumption to the point where marginal revenue
equa ls marginal cost (price) .

Since the maximum amount of wa ter the con-

s ume r can us e depends on the maximum all o tme nt decreed by th e State Enginee r
and the s ub sequen t allotmen t of the board of directors, the potential for
a more effic i e nt allocation of water is greatly impair e d.
The i r riga tion di st rict ha s bo th strong and weak point s when comparing it to other institution s employed in deve l oping and allocating
water f or agricultural us e .

It has, howeve r, had littl e effect on the

water policy of the stat e .

It would seem that the farmers have not been

willing t o bind themse l ves so thoroughly t o the dictates of a three-man

16 3Thomas , The Devel opmen t of Institutions Under Irrigation, pp.
128-129.

board as they have historically favored the smaller mutual company .
Al so the security offered by an irrigation district has gene rall y been
insu ff icient to create a very good market for their bonds.
The Municipal Water De partment
Responsibilities of municipal
water departments

For the most part each city, town or village in the state attemp t s
to supply its reside nts wit h an adequate quantity and quality of water
for domestic needs.

This responsibility is generally vested in a depart-

ment of water supply, an agency of th e municipa l government.

The municipal water department is most often headed by the city
engineer who has primary responsibility for maint ain ing the physical
plant; i.e., pipe lines, storage reservoir, meters, and treatment

plant.

164

There is general l y a crew of engineers and common laborers,

depending on the size of the department and the type of water works,
employed t o maintain and operate the system.
Policy matters associated with deve loping additional supplies and
allocating water among users, is the responsibility of the mayor and city
council.

Depe nding on th e size of the town, an administrator may be

hired to manage the water department, or o ne councilman may be given that

s pecific responsibility.

Some cities in Utah employ a city manager, who

would be responsible for administering the water department as well as
other departments of city government.

164

He may be given authority to emp l oy

Hirshleifer, Water Supply, p. 176.
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whatever system of all oca tion he feels will be most efficien t, but final
responsibility res t s with the e l ected city officia l s .
Of the many sources of water which are utilized by Utah ci ti es , by
far the most extens i ve are the wa t ers f r om mo unta in streams .

The ear l y

settlements in Utah were gene rall y situated near the mouth of a canyon s o
th e h igh quality stream wa t er could be ut il iz ed for dom es ti c use before
flowing on t o o ther uses.

165

Since water rights accrue to thos e em ploy-

ing wa t e r be nefici all y , stream wa t er comprises at least part of the wat e r

supply of most Utah municipalities.
Springs and artesian wells are of t e n sou rces of municipal wat er.

Dee p wel l s, f r om which water i s pumped from underground aquifers, a r e
being incr eas ingly utiliz ed, especia lly a long the Wasatch Front .

166

As demands have increas ed relative to the s uppl y of wat e r f rom
mountain streams, st eps have bee n take n t o utiliz e lower quali t y water
from whateve r source is possib l e .

Wat er treatment makes th e sour ce

safe, but also increases the burdens on municipal wate r departme nt s .
Water for domestic use must exceed spec ifi c minimum standards, set

by the State Department of Publi c Health.

Thes e s tandard s have become

incre asingly important as population and industrial growth have ex panded

bo th the demand for wate r and the possibilities of po lluti on .

At pr ese nt

the state r e quires that the dt sso lved solids in the water not exceed 500
mill igrams per litter (mg/ 1).

165
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Hut chins, Mutual Irrigation Companies, p . 23.
rnterview "i th Winegar .
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To achieve this minimum standard , many municipal water departments
maintain some type of treatme nt plant.

These range from simple chlorina-

tion to a complex system of sedimentation, coagulati on, filtration,

aeration, softening, and disinfection. 167

Although most domestic water

passes through some treatment , a few water supplies are sufficiently

pure to meet standards without.

Allocating the water resource

For the most part, the allocation process employed by municipal
water departments fo llows quite c l ose l y the typical allocating system
used in our society for other consump t ion commod ities in the market.
Anyone in the system is entitled to use whatever amount of water he

wants, at the established price.

The effic iency of this allocati on

system depends primarily on the pricing mechan i sm employed and whether
or not quantity is determinabl e.

Basically all munic ipaliti es in the state

168

use e ither a fixed

surcharge o r a block sys t em to price domestic water. 169
water is not metered a fixed s ur charge sys tem is used.

Generally, when
With this system

a set price is charged each customer regardless of th e quantity used.
Sometimes the size of the payment is a func tion of the water using facili ti es in the home .

167

The significant point is that only one price is charged

Hirshleifer, Water Supply, p. 176.
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At least those along the Wasatch Front and it is assumed others
in the state will not differ substantially.
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B. Delworth Gardner and Seth H. Schick, Factors Affecting Consumption of Household Water in Northern Utah, Utah Agricultural Experiment
Station Bulletin 449, November, 1964, p. 6.
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each customer; the price does not va r y wi th the quantity used. 170
The "block 11 o r "multiple price" sys t em requires that water be

metered to eac h household, th e c ust ome r being charged only for that quan tity he uses.

Generally a minimum surcharge is made to cover consump -

tion up to a certain l eve l with successive blocks of water above that
minimum being sub j ect to a schedule of prices, referred to as "block"
or

11

marginal" prices.

171

Some times these marginal prices are the sam e

for each successive block of water, but gene rally they diminish as the
quantity of water increases . 172

Evaluation of the municipal
water department

The pricing policies of the municipal water departments 173 could
be their greatest claim to efficiency.
case.

Unfortunately, this is not the

The me thod of employing a fixed surcharge invites inefficient

allocation of water.

An unmetered customer will use water until its

marginal va lue is zero, corresponding to its zero marginal cost .

This

is wast ef ul because th e water department cannot provide th e commodity
at zero cost, and society will lose the difference between cost of delivery and the value in the use of excess units of wa ter co nsumed.

170

Ibid.
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Ibid., p. 7.
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several of the institutions already discussed r etail some water
to households and employ th e above mentioned pricing policies . However,
there has been no discussion of this problem in preceding sections. This
discussion will apply to all such institutions .

This method could be justified if the system were so small (and
supply so abundant) that increased savings from more efficient utilization of the water were less than the cost of metering equipment necessary to determine quantities used.

However, it seems that the system

would need to be very small with little prospect for growth, and that
the water has no economical alternative use to justify such inefficiency.
Most municipalities in Utah that emp loy marginal pricing, charge
diminishing marginal prices on sucCessive blocks of water us e d.

When

diminishing block pricing is used the consumer will equate marginal
value to marginal cost.

Such a system would not reduce efficiency if

there were only one us er in the system or all users consumed water in
equal quantities.

This situation would seldom occur.

When consumers

use quantities in differ e nt blocks they pay different prices on marginal
units, violating the criterion of equimarginal allocation and thus
reduce eff ici ency.
An argument sometimes made in defense of this policy is that
reduc ed prices for larger quantities of water will encourage heavier
use in the watering of lawns, building water fountains, and other
community beautifying endeavors.

Those who pose this argument feel the

loss in eff iciency is offset by increased value of property and community
esteme.

The re is little doubt that diminishing block pricing does ex-

pand consumption, but neve rth e less, is inefficient because of the reasons
already discussed.
Optimum economic efficiency can be achieved if only one marginal
price i s set for all units of water consumed.

Under such conditions the

consumer will push consumption only to the point where the value of

90

marginal utility equals marg ina l cost ( pr i ce).

Since on l y one price

faces all consumers, values of marginal utility are eq ual for all con sumers and no reallocation of water can increase the t o tal valu e o f
communi t y utility.

There is a considerab l e oppo rtunit y t o increase

efficienc y by es tabli shi ng a constant water price, ope n to all water
r eta iling in sti tuti ons of t he state, but primarily in the municipal
water departments.

Implementati on of such a pol i cy, it would seem,

would be r e lative l y simple .

174

174
Hir sh l e i fer ' s Water Supply contains an e xcellent discussion of
wa t e r ra t es, pp. 87-113.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS
This study has attempted to evaluate the water institutions within

the state upon their own merits, as provided by legal foundation ,
statements of intended policy, and actual practice.

Focus has been

on barriers to economic effic iency within individual institutions.

Li ttle has been said about the interp l ay and overlapping of all these
institutions, collectively.

While some of these institutions may be

conduci ve to efficiency by themselves, when operating simultaneously

together, the result may be extensively inefficient because of duplication of administrative str ucture and faci l ities, and possibly eve n conf licting ob jectives and practices.

Duplication of Facilities
The mutua l irrigation companies have al r eady been discussed in this

context .

Intracompany transactions are rather f lexi bl e wh il e excessive

barriers exis t for int ercompany negotiations.

Consolidation of many

neighboring companies shou ld result in subs tantial incr eases in effi-

ciency, due to the following reasons:

l.

The area of transfer flexibility wou ld be expanded.

2.

Fewer and larger ditches would reduce water l osses due to see -

page and evaporation, land devot ed to ditches would decline, and maintenance ex penses would fall.
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3.

Larger companies could afford to employ more efficient, pro-

gressive management, and all company resources, human and capital ,

could be employed more intensively.
4.

Fear of litigation because of adversely affecting neighboring

companies through transfer policies would be greatly reduced.
The trend seems to be toward consolidation of companies, or at

least, incorporation.

A concerted effort should be made by state and

local government officials and all interested private parties to exp l ore
the possibilities for facilitating thi s movement.

Perhaps a detailed

study which pinpoints the effect of consolidation upon the individual
income of each stockho ld er would help to convince users of water of the
desirability of such a move.

Not only agricultural us es experience this type of inefficiency.
Indeed, urban water all ocation of t en fur nishes examples of duplication

of effort and facilities.

However, the urban problem is generally one

of different types of institutions attempting to accomplish the same
purpose within a metropolitan area.

The best example of duplication of facilities is Salt Lake County,
but these arrangements may typify many other localities in th e stat e as
well.

There is no intent here to ou tline specific recommendations t o

correct s pecific probl ems in Salt Lake City.

It is hoped, however, that

this discussion will help point out some serious inefficiencies that

are prevalent throughout the state that need t o be studied further,
and may gui de, to some degree, future institutiona l deve lopment and/or
reorganization.

Within Salt Lake County there are three major water institutions
that service urban users:

(1) The Salt Lake City Water Department
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deve lops, processes, and distributes water to residents of Salt Lake City
and a few other users throughout the County who have been without a sour ce

of supply .

( 2) The Me tropolitan Water Di st rict wholesal es water t o Salt

Lake Cit y and several o ther users throu ghout the valle y .

This wat er is

f i nishe d in a large ultra - modern treatment plant, built and operated by
th e dist ri c t.

(3) The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy Di s tri ct

sup plies water to uses and us ers through the remainder of the Cou nt y.
They have deve l oped part of their supplies and pu r chase the r es t from
the Metropo litan Water District.
In ad diti on to these , many municipalities thro ughout the county-Sand y , Murray, Grange r, Magna, etc. --mainta in wa t e r departments.

Many

of them d evelop and tr ea t the ir own water supplies and supp l ement those
supp lies , when neces sar y, with wa t e r purchased from the Conservancy
District or Me tr o politan Water Di s trict.
Also, th e re are approximately 10 priva t e water companies in exis tenc e

from ear l y days in the area southeas t of Salt Lake Cit y .

These are

mutual companies furni s hing wa t er fo r domestic use t o stockho ld ers in a
small a r ea .

All in all ther e is a wide d i vers ity of institutions try ing t o
deve l op and dis tribute wat er in Salt Lake Count y.

It seems r e as onabl e to

believe that ineffici e ncy must r es ult fro m such a cong l omeration of
ins tituti ons .

1.

Some possible reasons are:

Area of re spons ibilit y is of t e n sma ll limiting f r ee movement

of water between all users in the metropolitan ar ea.

2.

It is reasonable to believe that there would be eco nomics of

s ca l e in wa t er devel o pme nt, tr eatment, and al l oca t ion .

This might be
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due to the fact that some physical plant is necessary to handle water
and administer its distribution, each of which requires personnel and
insures maintenance costs wh ich should decline as water quantity increases.

In addition, specialized personnel can be hired for development, treatment, and maint enance purposes if companies are large.
The Ogden area has many of these same problems.

Og den City maintains water treatment plants.

For instance,

However, Since the creation

of the Weber Basin Conservancy District, Ogden purchases a good share
of their finished water from the District.

Still at times of peak use,

the city operates its treatment plant rather than purchase additional
water from the District, but this means the plant is seldom used at full
capacity.
A recent study of water treatment costs conducted in California,

1

concluded that unit construction costs decreased with increasing capacity
between l and 300 acre fe et capacity .

Also, operation and maintenance

costs per unit processed decreased with incr eas ing flow capacity within
the same rang e.

In light of this study it is difficult to see why both treatment
plants must be o perated .

Whatever the reason, efficiency would be in-

creased by a reduction of duplicate facilities.
Generally, the problem of duplication is not so prevalent in smaller,
less populated cities and towns.

In these types of towns the respon-

sibilities for providing domestic water generally resides in only one

1

Gerald T. Orlab and Marvin R. Lindorf, '~ost of Water Treatment
in California," J ournal of American Water Works Association, L (January,
1958), pp. 45-55.
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institution, the municipal water department.

As was previously discussed,

distribution of water by water departments is somewhat free from many
of th e inefficiencies experienced by other institutions.

In some cases,

cooperation with neighboring municipalities or othe r types of institu-

tions in develo ping and distributing water supplies may result in reduction of operating costs as we ll as the possibility of adverse third
party effects.

Institutional Development

An overal l evaluation of the water institutional structure in Utah
over time gives c ause for optimism about the future of water allocation
in the state.

From the very beginning it seems that these institutions
I

have been used as vehicles for permitting greater trans fer flexibility.
The mutual irrigation company provides irrigators the option of
transferring wa t er within the company to

th ~

uses and points of use

realizing the greatest marginal productivity of water.

The municipal

water department offers this same opportunity to domestic users.
Growth and development of the state have considerably enhanced
the des irability of increased transfer f l exibi lities, and have put new
demands on the wate r allocating institutions.

It is just as important

now that water be able to move free ly to uses or users across the valley
as it used to be for a farme r to rent water to his neighbor.

To facili-

tate thes e types of trans fers, instituti ons such as the metropolitan and
conservancy districts have been es tabli shed.

These institutions traverse

city and even coun ty lines to add considerable flex ibilit y to the system.
It is true that some of these institutions are less likely to be
eff icient than others .

Also, establishment of new institutions has often
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not resulted in abandonment of older, less efficient ones.
resulted in much of the duplication already discussed.

This has

But the water

users in the state have been continually attempting to achieve greater

flexibility and resulting efficiency by es tablishment of new institutions.
Indeed, it would seem that the answer to the states water allocation

problems lies in the estab lishment of larger more effic i e nt institutions.
However, the primary fu nction of these larger institutions must be to
create an atmosphere where in the free market will be, in so far as

possible, relied upon to allocate the water resources .

This is so be -

cause of the distinct advantages of free market allocation, some of
which are summarized below.

1.

Flexibility.

Water users would be free to transfer water be-

tween users and uses at their discretion so that the value of the mar-

g inal product of water in all uses and among users wil l be equa l.

Third

party effec t s must not be over l ooke d but the parties in question should
be free to negotiate a transfer that is acceptable to all.
2.

Security.

The proprietorship of a water right must be such

that the owner will be able to determine final usage of the water.

This

will faci lit ate op timum investment in the water rights, use facilities,

and management programs.

If rights ar e sold in the market voluntarily,

the market price constitutes compensation for one party giving up the
right to another.
3.

Marginal pricing.

It is important for optima l allocation that

the price of water be a function of the quantity used.

Op timum eff iciency

requires that one marginal price be set for all units of water consumed

and that that price be equal to all users, insofar as the costs associa-
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ted with distribution are equal.

In pushing consumption to the point

where pric e e quals value of marginal utility, all consumers will have
equal va lu es of mar gina l utility since they face equal prices.

1&•r

The trend throughout the development of Utah's water resources has
been toward increased flexibility and resulting economic efficiency .
The role of institutions in this positive development has been consid -

erable.

Every e ncouragement sh ould be give n by the State Legislature,

by the e xecutive department of state government, by the judiciary, and
by citiz e ns alike for this trend toward efficiency to continue and even

be accentuated.

The entire economy of the state, and the well being of

its people will thus be greatly enhanced.

vT
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